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privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases. Second, in the quest to identify the 
sources of increased profitability after privatization, we find little evidence that validates concerns 
of generalized market power abuses, exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits. Third, the 
manner in which privatization is carried out matters. Transparency and homogeneity in procedures, 
speed, and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for 
corruption and discretion. Finally, privatization’s success is enhanced by two complementary 
policies: re-regulation or deregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces; 
and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms’ access to capital 
at lower costs. Overall, the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased 
profitability and productivity, firm restructuring, fiscal benefits, output growth and even quality 
improvements. Most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design, opaque 
processes with heavy state involvement, lack of re-regulation and a poor corporate governance 
framework.   
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  3  41.  Introduction 
After decades of poor performance and inefficient operations by state-owned enterprises, 
governments all over the world earnestly embraced privatization.  Thousands of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have been turned over to the private sector in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and 
Eastern and Western Europe.  This trend was spurred by the well-documented poor performance 
and failures of SOEs (Mueller, 1989; Boardman and Vining, 1989) and the efficiency 
improvements after privatization around the world (Megginson et al., 1994; Ehrlich et al., 1994; La 
Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999; Frydman et al., 1999; López-Calva and Sheshinski, 1999; 
Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2003a; 
among many others).  Yet despite the body of evidence on privatization that points to improved 
performance, firm restructuring, fiscal benefits, increased output, and quality improvements, the 
initial trend has lost momentum, and privatization efforts have stalled to a great extent in recent 
years.   
What is behind this slowdown? Privatization has recently been attacked by academia, 
politicians and the media, who have voiced concerns about its record, the sources of the gains and 
its impact on social welfare and the poor.
2 The negative reaction to privatization is reflected in 
opinion polls and some governments’ reluctance to further their privatization programs.
3 Popular 
support for privatization, as for other structural policies, may be expected to follow a “J-curve,” 
declining at first and recovering when the policy matures (Przeworski, 1991). However, if 
politicians retreat from the now unpopular effort to restructure the role of the state in the economy, 
the window of opportunity to deepen privatization efforts may close.
4 While many countries have 
implemented large privatization programs, there is still a considerable way to go. In many 
countries, the state retains a large presence, often across many sectors of the economy (La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer; 2002). In these circumstances, it becomes imperative to determine 
the real record on privatization and draw lessons from it. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the privatization experience and assess the 
empirical validity of the main concerns voiced against it. A particular focus on Latin America may 
be warranted in this analysis since, after the transition economies of Eastern Europe, Latin 
                                                           
2 See Bayliss (2002) and Birdsall and Nellis (2002) for recent cross-country reviews of privatization failures. Criticism 
about specific countries or industries includes: Harper (2000), Wallsten (2001), Stiglitz (2002), Nellis (1999) and Coes 
(1998).  
3 Even in the United Kingdom, which led the privatization effort in the 1980s, polls show that privatization is 
becoming less popular. In 1983 around 43 percent of people wanted more privatization, by 1992 that number was 
down to 24 percent, and by 2002 it barely reached 19 percent (The Economist, 1998). 
  5America is the region with the largest decline in the state’s share of production in the last 20 years. 
The extent of privatization in Latin America and the quality of the data has allowed researchers to 
produce comprehensive analyses that provide appropriate academic responses to some of the main 
criticisms raised. 
Overall, the empirical record shows that privatization leads not only to higher profitability, 
but also to large output and productivity growth, fiscal benefits, and even quality improvements 
and better access for the poor.  Instances of failure exist, but in light of the overwhelming 
evidence, this should not be turned into an argument to stop privatization.  The analysis in this 
paper suggests that privatization failures can be understood within a political economy framework. 
The roots can be traced to substantial state participation in opaque processes; poor contract design; 
inadequate re-regulation; and insufficient deregulation and corporate governance reform that 
increase the cost of capital and limit firm restructuring in a competitive environment. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives a brief overview of the rationale and 
extent of privatization around the world. The rest of the sections are structured around what we 
consider the four main areas of concern about privatization. Section 3 deals with the first hurdle: to 
confirm that the profitability increases recorded by the literature are robust, unbiased and are not 
solely explained by sample selection of the best firms. The first generation of privatization papers 
suffered from this problem. However, a recent series of Latin American studies analyzed here uses 
comprehensive firm-level data that provide robust evidence on performance changes after 
privatization. Section 4 analyzes criticisms of privatization concerning the welfare of workers, 
consumers and the state by asking: Who pays for the profitability gains? The evidence suggest that 
although labor cost reductions and price increases account for part of the gains, the bulk of the 
profitability improvement lies in deep firm restructuring and productivity growth. Section 5 
examines the concerns about the proper role of the state in firm restructuring before privatization 
and the opacity of procedures, which may lead to collusion and corruption. Section 6 assesses the 
role of complementary policies such as deregulation, re-regulation, and corporate governance 
reform. Particular attention is placed on sectors with market power and inefficient regulation 
following privatization. Section 7 concludes, providing some policy implications from the 
privatization record thus far. 
 
2.  A Brief Look at the Privatization Experience around the World 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
4 Earle and Gehlbach (2003) provide a framework that rationalizes why policymakers may pay too much attention to 
public sentiment and thus refrain from potentially welfare-improving actions. 
  6Fifty years ago, many famous economists and politicians favored state ownership of firms in 
several industries as monopoly power and externalities produced market failures. However, in the 
last ten years, the evidence on the failures of SOEs around the world and developments in contract 
and ownership theory have led to a reassessment of the benefits of state ownership in production 
(Shleifer, 1998). The literature emphasizes two reasons for the poor record of state ownership.  
First, the managerial strand of the literature reflects the idea that imperfect monitoring and poor 
incentives for managers of SOEs translates into inferior performance. There are many reasons to 
believe this would be so. The average SOE is not traded on the stock market and the threat of a 
takeover does not exist as control rests in the hands of the state. Discipline from creditors does not 
play much of a role either because most SOE loans are public debt and losses are typically covered 
by subsidies from the treasury. Additionally, the boards of directors rarely implement good 
corporate governance practices and management turnover obeys political rather than market forces 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).  
The second strand of the literature emphasizes the political economy aspects of state 
production.  The political view points to the inherent conflict of interest in running SOEs, as 
managers seek to maximize their political capital and pursue inefficient decisions. Political 
interference in the firm’s production results in excessive employment, poor choices of products 
and location, and inefficient investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; La Porta and López-de-
Silanes, 1999).  SOEs face soft-budget constraints that allow them to implement such practices, as 
governments may not want to risk the political cost of firms going bust (López-Calva and 
Sheshinski, 1999). The basic claims of the two strands of the literature have been validated by 
empirical research on SOEs and firm performance after privatization around the world.
5 
Motivated by the evidence of SOE failures, governments in more than 100 countries have 
undertaken privatization programs in the last twenty years (Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
Throughout the world, annual revenues from privatization soared during the late 1990s, peaking in 
1998 at over US$100 billion (OECD, 2001). Not surprisingly, industrial countries have pursued 
privatization less vigorously than developing nations. Between 1984 and 1996, the participation of 
SOEs in industrial countries declined from a peak of 8.5 to about 5 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP), while in developing countries production from state-owned companies declined 
more steeply (see Figure 1). According to López-Calva and Sheshinski (1999), between 1980 and 
1997, SOEs’ activities as a percentage of GDP decreased from about 11 to 5 percent in middle 
income countries and from 15 to 3 percent in low income economies. Developing countries have 
  7also seen large reductions in SOE employment. In middle-income countries, SOE employment has 
come down from a peak of 13 to about 2 percent of total employment, while low-income countries 
have gone from over 20 to about 9 percent (López-Calva and Sheshinski, 1999). 
These averages mask great regional variations in the size and economic importance of the 
remaining state-owned production (see Figure 1). In Sub-Saharan Africa, only a few governments 
have openly adopted an explicit state-owned enterprise divestment strategy. The African 
privatization effort has been significant in only a handful of countries and state production still 
accounts for over 15 percent of GDP in the region.
6 Asia is another region with large variations, as 
several Asian countries have not consistently pursued a privatization strategy. China, for example, 
has only recently committed to privatizing all but the largest state enterprises. In India, where 
privatization has thus far not figured prominently on the agenda, it is reported that 43 percent of 
the country’s capital stock is still owned by the state. Even after the Asian crisis of 1997, when 
private equity funds and multinationals were expecting large state-owned fire sales, many 
governments in the region still hung on to their assets in sectors such as energy, 
telecommunications, transportation and banking (The Economist, 2001). 
In contrast, transition economies and Latin American countries have been very active in 
privatization. During the 1990s, transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
accounted for 21 percent of total privatization revenues in developing countries, second only to 
Latin America (see Figure 2). In order to facilitate their shift to a market economy, most transition 
countries launched “mass privatization” programs that resulted in dramatic reductions of state 
ownership. These programs, however, have sometimes been unpopular given accusations of 
corruption and foot-dragging on implementing corporate governance reforms that has afforded 
poor protection for new minority investors.   
Even against the backdrop of massive economic transformations in transition economies, 
the privatization record of Latin America seems remarkable. In the 1990s, Latin America 
accounted for 55 percent of total privatization revenues in the developing world (see Figure 2). 
The decline in economic activity of SOEs has been more substantial in Latin America than in Asia 
and Africa, bringing levels close to those of industrialized countries (see Figure 1). However, from 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
5 See Boardman and Vining, 1989; Megginson et al., 1994; Ehrlich et al., 1994; La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999; 
Frydman et al., 1999; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; and Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2003a, among others. 
6 However, recent research shows that the privatization effort in Africa may have been highly underestimated. Bennell 
(1997) argues that most papers studying privatization in Africa have been based on low quality or outdated samples.  
Using a comprehensive survey of privatization transactions that spans sixteen years (1980–1995) and includes over 
2,000 privatizations, he concludes that African privatization programs are larger than previously thought and that they 
have increased substantially during the 1990s.  
  8being the most active region in the 1990s, Latin America has virtually halted its privatization 
process in recent years. 
The privatization impetus has also faded in other regions, leaving the bureaucrats very 
much in business. In fact, SOEs still account for more than 20 percent of investment, and about 5 
percent of formal employment (Kikeri, 1999). When appropriately measured, by looking at 
ultimate ownership, governments may own or control much more than is apparent at first sight. A 
clear example is the case of government ownership of banks. Looking at data for the late 1990s, 
after bank privatization programs had been completed in many countries, the world mean of 
government ownership of the top ten banks was still 42 percent; and a somewhat lower 39 percent 
if we exclude former or current socialist countries (La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). 
These data suggest that, while privatization has decreased government ownership, it has not 
reduced it to negligible levels. 
Dramatic differences in the extent of privatization are also evident within regions. In Latin 
America, for example, countries with previously large SOE sectors, such as Ecuador, Nicaragua 
and Uruguay, have barely privatized in the 1990s, while others such as Argentina Bolivia, Guyana, 
Panama and Peru have raised revenues from comprehensive privatization programs that amount to 
over 10 percent of GDP (see Figure 3).   
The difference in the extent of privatization across countries and the large amount of assets 
in the hands of the state highlight the importance of understanding the privatization record so far 
and of developing lessons for future privatization programs.
7 
 
3.  Which Firms Are Up for Sale? Concerns about What is Privatized 
 
3.1. Sample Selection Bias 
 
Privatization studies analyze the impact on firm performance by comparing pre- and post-
privatization firm-level data. This literature has established worldwide evidence on the benefits of 
privatization in terms of increased firm profitability (i.e., Boubakri and Cosset, 1998 and 1999; 
Megginson et al., 1994; and Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). However, critics have suggested that 
this evidence may be the result of sample selection bias, which may arise from five basic sources. 
First, politicians who conduct privatization have the incentive to only sell the healthiest firms—
                                                           
7 The analysis in this paper only covers the privatization experience at the “country” or federal level—that is, assets 
sold by the central or federal government—which account for the majority of assets sold around the world so far.  A 
different sample and experience is that of the privatization of services at the local, municipal or county level, where 
local governments “privatize” the public provision of services.  These programs have only taken place in a few nations 
  9what critics refer to as the “crown jewels.” According to this hypothesis, politicians only sell 
viable assets and keep poor performers, as investors engage in “cherry-picking” (Bayliss, 2002). 
Second, several studies are based on information about firms privatized through public offerings 
on the stock exchange. Such samples are thus biased towards the largest, and probably the best-
performing firms. A third source of sample selection comes from the greater availability of data 
from industrialized countries, which may have relatively better-performing firms. Cross-country 
firm-level analyses are therefore biased as their samples include a disproportionate share of well-
performing firms.
8   The fourth source emerges from the intense focus of the studies on 
oligopolistic or heavily regulated industries, where the gains from privatization may come from 
market power. Finally, a last source of concern in interpreting the positive results of privatized 
firms is survivorship bias. This bias is introduced when firms that went bankrupt after privatization 
are excluded from the sample that compares pre- and post-privatization performance. 
Several early studies on firm performance after privatization in Latin America suffer from 
these biases (see Table 1). Some of these papers are specific case studies of a limited number of 
large firms (i.e., Galal et al., 1994; Chong and Sánchez, 2003); others do not include econometric 
or statistical analysis (i.e., Sánchez and Corona, 1993; Hachette and Luders, 1994; Birch and Haar, 
2000); others are econometric studies of one or two heavily regulated sectors (i.e., Ramamurti and 
Vernon, 1991; Ramamurti, 1996 and 1997; Pinheiro, 1996; López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa, 
1995); and some provide evidence from cross-country analysis of oligopolistic sectors such as 
telecommunications (i.e., Ramamurti, 1996; Petrazzini and Clark, 1996; Ros, 1999; Wallsten, 
2000).   
Overcoming sample selection bias is empirically difficult and requires large amounts of 
pre- and post-privatization information for nearly complete cross-industry samples of privatized 
firms of all sizes. La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) deal with these issues by collecting 
information from 95 percent of non-financial firms privatized in Mexico in the period 1983–1992.
9  
An additional benefit of this sample is that, with the exceptions of electricity and oil, Mexico 
undertook a comprehensive privatization program in which the goal was to eliminate state 
ownership across the board.  As a result, the sample gathered contains large, medium and small 
firms spanning over 40 sectors and comprising mining, manufacturing, agricultural products and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
such as the United States (López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and England, where public service provision 
by the private sector has become a central issue. 
8 Differences in accounting procedures may also be problematic in determining adequate measures of operating 
performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
9 For accounting comparison reasons, financial firms privatized in Mexico were analyzed in a separate paper (see 
López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa, 1995).  
  10services as varied as night clubs and soccer teams. These characteristics make it a good sample for 
testing the validity of the concerns raised above. The conclusion from the study is that sample 
selection bias does not explain the positive results reached by privatization, as profitability of 
privatized firms increases across sectors and firm sizes, even considering bankrupt firms. The 
median firm experienced a 24-percentage-point increase in operating profitability. There is little 
evidence that the Mexican government sold the “crown jewels,” especially when one considers 
that this oil-rich nation retained petrol and some petrochemicals as state assets.
10    
Using comprehensive data and a methodology similar to López-de-Silanes (1997) and La 
Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), a recent research effort across Latin America has expanded the 
detailed privatization analysis for the region, helping us address the concerns raised in this section. 
The papers cover the programs of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru 
(Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2003a).
11 These studies compare firm performance before and after 
privatization, adjusting for macroeconomic and industry effects with matching firms. Figure 4 
summarizes the data collection efforts of this series of papers. With the exception of Brazil, where 
access to pre-privatization data for non-publicly traded firms was denied, the coverage across firm 
sizes for all countries is enough to put to rest the main concerns regarding sample selection. The 
samples used for Bolivia and Chile are the smallest, around 66 percent in terms of value, while for 
the rest of the countries the samples cover 80, 90 and even 95 percent of transaction values and 
number of privatization contracts.   
Extensive groundwork and creative ways of accessing non-public information allowed 
researchers to collect comprehensive pre- and post-privatization data. In Peru, for example, Torero 
(2002) obtained pre-privatization information from “white books,” or original privatization 
documents that were available to prospective bidders when state-owned enterprises were being 
privatized.  He was also able to collect comprehensive post-privatization data from pre-
privatization dossiers, the Supervising Committee of Companies and Securities, the 
Superintendence of Banks and Securities, and other regulatory agencies. All in all, Torero 
collected information for nearly 90 percent of privatized firms in Peru. For Argentina, Galiani, 
Gertler, Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger (2003) drew a comprehensive sample based on 
information from individual companies, the Ministry of Economy and regulatory agencies.  
                                                           
10López-Calva and Sheshinski (1999) make similar claims after they analyze privatization programs and remaining 
SOE assets around the world.  
11 The specific studies in the book are: Galiani et al. (2003) for Argentina; Garrón et al. (2003) for Bolivia; Anuatti-
Neto et al. (2003) for Brazil; Fischer et al. (2003) for Chile; Pombo and Ramírez (2003) for Colombia; Chong and 
López-de-Silanes (2003c) for Mexico and Torero (2002) for Peru. 
  11In Colombia, with smaller privatization programs than those of Argentina and Peru, Pombo 
and Ramírez (2003) collected comprehensive information on the privatization of the Instituto de 
Fomento Industrial (IFI).
12 They constructed an unbalanced panel dataset with records from the 
Annual Manufacturing Survey starting in 1974 and ending in 1998. Their panel has over 140 
variables covering 94 specific ISIC groups and survey information of about 6,000 establishments.  
For the case of Mexico, Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003b) use the same database as La 
Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), which combines information from the original privatization 
white books with information collected from surveys sent to privatized firms and data from the 
various census bureaus. The information for Mexico basically covers the whole program with 218 
privatized non-financial SOEs between 1983 and 1992.    
In Bolivia, information on privatized SOEs was particularly difficult to gather due to the 
relatively small size of firms and the lackadaisical record-keeping efforts in the country.
13 Garrón 
et al. (2003) complemented original information from government institutions with information 
collected through a survey sent to privatized firms.  
For Chile, Fischer, Serra and Gutiérrez (2003) faced significant complications in collecting 
data due to the long privatization period (1979–2001) and the change in accounting standards in 
1982. Despite these problems, their data provide systematic evidence that complements more 
descriptive work by others (i.e., Luders, 1991; Sáez, 1992).  
Finally, Brazil’s case proved the most difficult as Anuatti-Neto, Barossi-Filho, de Carvalho 
and Macedo were denied access to all pre-privatization information for non-publicly traded firms 
and were thus restricted to using information on firms traded on the stock exchange. Although their 
results may suffer from some sample selection bias, it represents one of the most comprehensive 
datasets in Brazil, covering close to 95 percent of the total value of privatization transactions. 
Overall, the coverage and industry-matching techniques of the recent series of privatization 
studies in Latin America reassure us that the higher profitability of privatized firms is hardly the 
result of sample selection bias.  
 
3.2. Non-Comparable Data  
 
There are two additional problems with data collection procedures relating to the comparability of 
firms before and after sale. In several countries, governments have either split existing SOEs to 
                                                           
12 The role of the IFI in creating new manufacturing enterprises located in late industries was central during the 1950s 
and 1960s. The largest private capital enterprises in the steel, chemical, paper, fertilizer, metalworking and automobile 
sectors today were former IFI-associated companies (Pombo and Ramírez, 2003). 
  12sell them as independent units, or grouped them together to form packages of firms to be sold as a 
unit.  In both cases, large amounts of data are needed to conduct a firm-by-firm analysis of the pre- 
and post-privatization periods. Having information disaggregated at the plant level and access to 
financial statements prepared before the sale are essential to keep units comparable across time.  A 
second set of problems with the data emerges from changes in the sample after privatization as the 
SOE may be merged with the acquiring firm or with one of its subsidiaries. In both cases a new 
entity is created, making it difficult, if not impossible, to make meaningful comparisons. 
Figure 5 summarizes the different problems faced by the researchers in the 7 Latin 
American countries that undertook recent comprehensive privatization analyses.  All countries had 
to deal with the issues raised above to different degrees. In some instances, the problem was solved 
using detailed firm-unit or plant-level accounting information provided by auditing companies 
before privatization (Torero, 2002; Galiani et al., 2003; Garrón et al., 2003). In other cases, this 
was done by taking advantage of privatization agreements that required firms to keep separate 
books for different units allowing data aggregation (Torero, 2002). Other methods used included 
estimating proxy financial information (Anuatti-Neto et al., 2003; Fischer et al., 2003; Pombo and 
Ramírez, 2003) or disassembling firms into their original constituents (Fischer et al., 2003; 
Anuatti-Neto et al., 2003). Finally, when none of the previous efforts could be undertaken, firms 
were discarded from the sample to ensure clean estimates.   
The resulting samples typically excluded: (1) some cases of SOEs for which, often due to 
mergers or spinoffs, data from the pre-privatization period was missing; (2) a few instances of very 
small state ownership shares being sold (Argentina and Chile), firms that underwent changes in 
accounting (Bolivia and Chile), and some very recent privatization cases (Bolivia and Brazil); and 
(3) firms that were liquidated after privatization, although robustness checks were applied to 
ensure results would not be significantly changed with their inclusion (see Figure 5). 
To summarize, several early privatization studies suffered from biases introduced by non-
comprehensive samples and the use of “poor” data when the nature of the firm changed before and 
after privatization. Today, due to recent Latin American studies outlined in this paper and other 
efforts, mainly for Eastern European countries, these concerns have been largely put to rest with 
comprehensive firm-level data across sectors and company sizes.
14  The rest of this section outlines 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
13 Not surprisingly, prior to the effort by Garrón et al. there had been no formal empirical study on the impact of 
privatization on firm performance in Bolivia. 
14 Comprehensive privatization studies for Eastern European countries have also found higher profitability results 
although the accounting data for such countries is more problematic. Some examples are Claessens et al. (1997) for the 
Czech Republic, Dyck (1997) for East Germany, and Frydman et al. (1999) for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland. For most of these cases accounting differences before and after privatization are of greater concern than for 
the case of Latin America, where SOEs used to file and collect similar information to that of private firms. 
  13the evidence on performance changes after privatization emerging from the Latin American 
countries included in Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003a).  
 
3.3. Evidence from Comprehensive Data Samples on Privatization in Latin America 
 
In this section we analyze the recent Latin American evidence on the effects of privatization. As 
previously explained, the data are some of the most comprehensive and up to date for the region, 
allowing us to address many of the concerns raised about privatization. The basic results for the 
sample of Latin American countries are presented in Figures 6 through 11.
15 We analyze 
profitability, operating efficiency, the behavior of inputs, output and taxes. In accordance with 
earlier worldwide evidence (i.e., Megginson et al., 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998 and 1999; 
D’Souza and Megginson, 1999), Latin American studies find improvements in firms’ profitability. 
These increases are typically accompanied by reductions in unit costs, boosts in output and lower 
or constant levels of employment and investment. The evidence suggests that higher efficiency, 
achieved through firm restructuring and productivity improvements, underpins profitability gains. 
The raw results on firm performance are followed by industry-adjusted information to verify their 
robustness. Whenever possible, we show the data for median firms as they are less affected by 
outliers.   
 
3.3.1. Raw  Data 
 
The evidence from Latin America shows substantial gains in profitability after privatization, 
measured by net-income-to-sales and operating-income-to-sales ratios (see Figure 6). For the 
countries in the sample, the median net-income-to-sales (operating-income-to-sales) ratio 
increased 14 (12) percentage points. The largest gains are in Peru and Argentina, where median 
changes reached about 20 percentage points. Brazil shows the smallest gains, between 2 to 5 
percentage points depending on the ratio. Unlike their counterparts in other countries, Colombian 
SOEs were highly profitable before privatization. The Colombian levels of relative profitability are 
                                                           
15 The data presented in this paper come from the series of papers in the book edited by Chong and López-de-Silanes 
(2003a).  Homogeneous data for such extensive samples are difficult to collect since not all the same information is 
available or reported for all firms in all countries. The figures in this section show comparable information across 
countries but the comparisons are not perfect. When we lack strictly comparable information, we do not include that 
data for these countries in the figures and we only discuss the results in the text. The specific information for each 
country comes from: Galiani, Gertler, Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger (2003) for Argentina; Anuatti-Neto, Barossi-
Filho, de Cavalho and Macedo (2003) for Brazil; Garrón, Machicado and Capra (2003) for Bolivia; Fischer, Serra and 
Gutiérrez (2003) for Chile; Pombo and Ramírez (2003) for Colombia; Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003b) for 
Mexico; and Torero (2002) for Peru. 
  14largely explained by the protective industrial policy implemented by the government during the 
1980s (Pombo and Ramírez, 2003).  
The data for Latin America also suggest that the main reason behind the profitability gains 
is the improved operating efficiency brought about by privatization. In Figure 7 we explore this 
issue using: costs-per-unit, the ratio of sales-over-assets and the ratio of sales-over-employment. 
Costs-per-unit plummet with the median decline equivalent to 16 percent for the countries with 
available data. The results are statistically significant at 1 percent for all countries except Chile. In 
4 out the 7 countries SOEs were highly unprofitable before privatization with losses above 10 
percent of sales in terms of net-income-to-sales. The exceptions are Chile and Bolivia, whose 
SOEs exhibited slightly positive profitability ratios, and Colombia, where the SOE sector was very 
profitable compared to private competitors.   
The sales-to-asset ratios show a similar trend on the rise in 4 out of 5 countries. The median 
country increase in ratio is 26 percent. Peru is the only country with a fall of about 20 percent in 
sales-to-assets as privatized SOEs engaged in large investments that overtook output increases. 
Finally, the impact on sales-to-employment is dramatic with a median gain of almost 70 percent. 
Chile and Mexico show the most impressive results, as sales-per-employee doubled. Information 
for Colombia, not in the figure for reasons of strict comparability, suggests that SOEs also 
underwent restructuring with significant efficiency gains. The mean (median) manufacturing firm 
in Colombia experienced a 43 (13) percent gain in labor productivity and the total factor 
productivity index increased at a rate of 2.4 percent per year.  
As Figure 8 shows, labor retrenchment is a significant component of the privatization 
experience in Latin America. Privatized firms reduced a substantial percentage of their workforce 
in almost all countries. The exception to this trend is Chile, where the mean number of workers in 
privatized firms increased by 15 percent and the median fell by 5 percent. In general, the median 
country reduced 24 percent of its workforce. Privatized SOEs in Colombia, Mexico and Peru show 
significant reductions as the median firm fired 24, 57, and 56 percent of its workforce, 
respectively. The magnitude of employment reductions in these countries speaks of SOEs with 
bloated workforces before their sale and prior adherence on the part of decision-makers to the 
political economy view of the benefits of privatization. The evidence on labor cuts suggests that 
transfers from workers to shareholders may be a significant component of the success of 
privatization. We will explore this issue in Section 4.  
A priori, the impact of privatization on investment is not clear. One could expect privatized 
firms to avoid new investments since SOEs usually have ample idle capacity. On the other hand, if 
  15the production process used by the SOE is outdated, one could expect a large increase in 
investment. Except for the case of Argentina, where investment increased by over 350 percent, the 
data for the rest of Latin America confirm the initial hypothesis as investment exhibits modest 
gains, or statistically insignificant changes.   
Our analysis so far suggests that the profitability gains of privatized firms are mostly due to 
efficiency gains and not to other related factors. Most countries show drastic cuts in employment 
and fairly consistent capital stocks. Perhaps the most striking finding is that the output of 
privatized SOEs dramatically increased, despite dwindling employment and modest investment. 
As Figure 9 shows, output increased significantly in the region. The largest gains are in Mexico 
and Colombia, where median output increased 68 and 59 percent respectively. The country with 
the lowest, albeit significant, increase in output is Brazil, where real sales went up 17 percent.  
 
3.3.2. Adjusted  Ratios 
 
Latin America underwent major economic transformations as countries embraced liberal policies 
and opened up their borders during the 1990s. Most of these countries expanded and contracted at 
various points, leading to concerns about the interpretation of the evidence just discussed. In 
particular, one may argue that the large profitability and output increases and the rapid growth in 
productivity may only be the result of macroeconomic and industry changes in the region. To 
isolate the role of privatization, the series of studies in Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003a) 
present industry-adjusted measures providing robustness to the patterns discussed so far.   
The data displayed in Figure 9 allow us to rule out macroeconomic factors as the driving 
force behind post-privatization output growth: median industry-adjusted sales grew 27.5 percent in 
the region. In Brazil and Peru, for example, matching private firms basically stagnated as the 
median industry-adjusted output of privatized firms in those countries increased at about the same 
rate as the raw numbers. Meanwhile, the improved economic conditions and industry factors in 
Mexico and Colombia account for about one-fifth and three-fifths of output growth respectively. 
Relative to industry benchmarks the median (mean) employment of privatized firms fell 
roughly 24 (35) percent in the region (see Figure 8).  In contrast, relative investment behavior 
differs across countries. Median industry-adjusted investment-to-sales and investment-to-asset 
ratios fell considerably in Brazil and Mexico, but showed a marked increase in Argentina, Chile 
and Colombia. 
The second most important finding of this section is shown in Figures 10 and 11, which 
make evident the closing gap between privatized and comparable private firms after privatization. 
  16The most dramatic example of convergence is for Mexico, where the net-income-to-sales gap 
between privatized and private firms disappeared and even turned slightly in favor of privatized 
SOEs. The Argentinean data, although not in the same comparable format, also show a similar 
pattern of “catching up.” The industry-adjusted net-income-to-sales (operating-income-to-sales) 
ratio increased 188 (129) percent after privatization. The profitability gap between Colombian 
privatized and private firms also closed, albeit from a different starting point. Before privatization, 
the median firm in the SOE energy sector was about 20 percentage points more profitable than its 
private counterpart. Substantially lower levels of protection of these firms explain the narrowing 
gap with the private sector after privatization. Finally, Brazilian and Chilean privatized samples 
also improved their relative profitability with respect to their industry competitors. In the case of 
Brazil, privatized SOEs became slightly more profitable than their private competitors, while the 
gap between Chilean privatized and private firms narrowed about 20 percent.   
Figure 11 shows the closing gap between privatized and private firms in terms of unit costs. 
Brazilian privatized firms quickly reduced the 9-percentage-point gap to about 2 percentage points, 
a similar level as Chilean firms before and after privatization. In Argentina, industry-adjusted unit 
costs declined 10 percent. Meanwhile, Mexico’s privatized SOEs substantially cut costs, 
eliminating a large 14-percentage-point gap with private competitors.  The catching-up effect of 
privatization is explained by the large gains in operating efficiency that more than survive industry 
adjustments. Relative to industry benchmarks, median sales-per-employee went up 9 percent in 
Argentina, 28 percent in Bolivia, and a massive 88 percent in Mexico.  Similarly, median industry-
adjusted sales-to-asset ratios increased 20 percent in Mexico, 34 percent in Brazil, 49 percent in 
Chile, and 142 percent in Bolivia.  All of these numbers suggest that a large component of the 
higher profitability comes from improved efficiency, lining up with the rest of the evidence 
presented in the following section.  
 
  174.  Who Wins and Loses from Privatization? Concerns about Exploitation of 
Market Power, Workers and the Government  
 
Some of the main criticisms against privatization are based on the belief that the gains in firm 
profitability are achieved at the expense of society. These gains are claimed to be extracted from 
consumers through the use of market power, from workers by means of lower salaries, and from 
the government, which gives up a stream of positive cash flows (Campbell-White and Bhatia, 
1998; Bayliss, 2002). In this section, we use the recent empirical evidence from Latin America and 
elsewhere to assess the sources of profitability gains of privatized SOEs. 
 
4.1.  Government Revenues 
 
Critics of privatization often argue that the government, and thus society at large, loses from 
privatization because it gives up a positive stream of cash flows and puts it in the hands of private 
buyers. The argument is extended to claim that the sale of SOEs is equivalent to a “privatization of 
gains and a socialization of losses.” In other words, well-connected groups are able to reap the 
profits of privatized firms and receive government-sponsored bailouts when things go wrong. The 
evidence used to support these claims comes mostly from case studies of profitable SOEs that 
were privatized, unprofitable SOEs that turned out to be great money-makers after privatization, 
and SOEs that became money-losers and went into financial distress. This perception has swayed 
public opinion because of the excessive costs levied on society in some cases of botched 
privatizations. In Mexico, for example, the bailouts granted to keep banks and highways from 
going bankrupt increased public debt from less than 25 of GDP to over 50 percent (López-Calva, 
2003).  
The underlying logic of these arguments is similar to that undergirding the arguments for 
the economic benefits of state production, which in the 1950s and 1960s justified the existence of 
SOEs on the grounds that they help solve market failures by taking into account the social costs of 
their actions. Today, there is ample academic evidence of the opposite in at least three areas. First, 
there is systematic evidence that SOEs are less efficient than private firms in developed and 
developing countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998). Second, SOEs’ inefficiency may 
be the natural result of political meddling as governments use them to achieve political objectives. 
This political use of state production leads to excessive employment, inefficient investments and 
inappropriate location of production sites, among other things (see López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Finally, during the last ten years, a large body of empirical work reviewed in 
  18previous sections shows that, by and large, privatization leads to substantial increases in the 
profitability of firms and not the other way around. 
The criticisms of privatization that center around what the government gives up disregard 
the fact that SOEs are typically money-losing entities before privatization and that the visible 
losses may underestimate the real bottom line as its precise magnitude is obscured by large cross-
subsidies from other SOEs and soft loans from the government. In fact, tax collection from SOEs 
improved after privatization in most Latin American countries analyzed in Chong and López-de-
Silanes (2003a). The only exception in the region is Brazil, which is the country with the smallest 
gains in profitability and where the net-taxes-to-sales ratio was still positive but fell around 1 
percentage point (the difference is not statistically significant). Meanwhile, in Mexico the ratio of 
net-taxes-over-sales increased 7.6 percentage points. Although we do not have direct information 
for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru, it is safe to assume that net-taxes-over-sales increased since 
the ratio of net-income-over-sales did so by between 12 and 20 percentage points. Increased fiscal 
revenues mean more resources that can be channeled to address pressing social needs, thereby 
benefiting society at large. 
Higher tax revenues, if managed appropriately, should allow governments an increased 
capability for welfare-improving activities to benefit the poorest segments of society. Argentina, 
Bolivia, Mexico and Peru are examples of countries where privatization revenues and the 
increased tax receipts from non-profit-making firms was probably large enough to offset the costs 
of job losses (Rama, 1999; Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2003c). However, privatization revenues 
need not be a blessing if they are misused. For example, Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003) point out that in 
Brazil privatization brought about high “macroeconomic costs” as its revenues may have delayed 
fiscal adjustment and helped prop up an overvalued currency. This is obviously not an argument 
against privatization, but against the political misuse of the resources it generates.  
Overall, the empirical literature on privatization shows that it impacts the government’s 
budget by reducing its previous subsidies to SOEs, obtaining substantial revenue from the sale and 
more taxes on higher profits. The benefits of a well-managed privatization program could be 
substantial, not only for the privatized firm but also for society. 
 
4.2.  Worker Exploitation 
 
The second potential source of gains after privatization is transfers from workers to shareholders as 
cuts in labor costs may account for a large fraction of reduced total costs. Labor cost reductions 
can come from two sources: fewer workers or lower wages and benefits. As explained in Section 
  193.3, the set of papers that look at comprehensive samples from Latin America find that direct 
employment by the median SOE falls between 20 to 30 percent after privatization depending on 
the measure (see Figure 8). Layoffs explain part of the cost reduction and thus higher profits after 
privatization. The other potential component is cuts in wages and benefits. The hypothesis that 
privatization leads to redistribution of income from workers to the new owners predicts a reduction 
in real wages and benefits for those workers that remain in the firm. Data on wages at the firm 
level are scarce, but for those countries with available information (Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico 
and Peru) the evidence shows the exact opposite: real and industry-adjusted wages of workers in 
privatized firms increase. As Figure 12 shows, real and industry-adjusted wages for the median 
firm increase by about 100 percent in Mexico and Peru. In Argentina, the increase is about 70 
percent, and in Bolivia the change is still positive but substantially smaller. 
  The two components of the transfers from workers to profits move in opposite directions. 
Therefore, the fraction of profitability changes that may be attributed to labor cost savings needs to 
consider the lower costs due to layoffs and the higher costs due to wage increases for the 
remaining workers. Following the methodology in La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), recent 
studies by Galiani et al. (2003), Garrón et al. (2003) and Torero (2002) compute the impact on 
profits from lower labor costs after privatization.
16 
The evidence from Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Peru in Figure 13 shows that, even with the 
extreme assumption that laid-off workers had zero productivity, the median savings from labor 
costs is equivalent to 23 (20) percent of gains in net-income-to-sales (operating-income-to-sales) 
after privatization. The range of calculations extends from close to 5 percent in Peru to 45 percent 
in Mexico. This back-of-the-envelope calculation is extreme since we are assuming zero 
productivity of laid-off workers.  If we assume that these workers are half as productive as those 
retained by the firm, the median savings from reduced labor costs for the countries with data falls 
to 11.6 (10) percent of the gains in net-income-to-sales (operating-income-to-sales). Overall, the 
evidence does show that labor cost reductions are a source of the gains after privatization, but it is 
hard to make the argument that these savings explain the bulk of the higher observed profitability. 
The welfare of displaced workers after privatization is also an issue for consideration. The 
calculations above also overstate the worker losses to the extent that some of those laid off found 
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where Wagebp is the average wage of employees 
in the SOE before privatization; Lbp is the number of workers employed before privatization; Lap is the number of 
employed workers after privatization; and Salesap is the value of sales after privatization. The resulting number is thus 
expressed as a fraction of sales. We then divide the number by the percentage-point increase in net-income-to-sales 
  20alternative employment or attach some value to leisure. In fact, Galiani et al. (2003) suggest that 
some of these workers did find jobs. They carried out a survey among displaced workers in 
Argentina and estimated that their welfare loss was equivalent to 39 to 51 percent of their pre-
privatization earnings and that 40 percent of them actually thought they were not worse off after 
privatization. This is actually surprising since most theories and evidence suggest that workers in 
SOEs are overpaid and have very low productivity (see Section 3.3).  Further work is needed in 
this area to provide clearer evidence on the extent of worker welfare losses, but the available 
evidence thus far suggests that although laid-off workers do lose in this process, the losses may not 
be as large as previously thought. 
Finally, privatization could also have compositional effects on the labor force and hurt 
unskilled workers disproportionately. The empirical evidence on this issue is inconclusive for the 
two Latin American countries with disaggregated wage and employment data. In Bolivia, blue-
collar workers fared better than white-collar employees did since only 4 percent of them were laid 
off and over 35 percent of white-collar workers were fired by the median firm. In terms of wages, 
the data run in the opposite direction as unskilled workers that remained saw their real (industry-
adjusted) wages increase only 4.2 (3.4) percent versus a 15 (30) percent rise for skilled workers. 
The case of Mexican blue-collar workers also shows inconclusive results, but this time with higher 
blue-collar layoffs in the median firm (61 percent or 32 percent industry-adjusted), and sharp rises 
in blue-collar real and industry-adjusted wages that climbed 148 and 122 percent respectively.  
Meanwhile, fewer white-collar employees were fired by the median firm (46 percent and 31 
percent industry-adjusted), but those who stayed enjoyed substantially smaller real wage increases 
than those of blue-collars (100 and 48 percent industry-adjusted). Therefore, for neither of these 
countries can we conclude that unskilled workers fare worse than skilled labor as a result of 
privatization.   
 
4.3.  Abuse of Market Power and Consumer Exploitation 
 
The last concern about the sources of post-privatization gains is that the increase in firm 
profitability may come at the expense of consumers through weak regulation and abuse of market 
power. The recent series of papers from Latin America reviewed in Section 3 provides useful data 
to assess these claims. If market power is a significant determinant of the gains, we should expect 
firms in noncompetitive sectors to experience large gains in operating income due to higher 
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workers.  
  21product prices. Since profits are likely to be higher in the noncompetitive sectors before and after 
privatization, the relevant comparison to establish the facts for this section is relative changes 
among privatized firms in competitive and noncompetitive sectors.   
For the Latin American countries with data disaggregated by competitive and 
noncompetitive sectors, we find that changes in profitability are generally larger in the competitive 
sector.
17 This evidence goes against the hypothesis that market power explains most of the gains. 
As Figure 14 shows, the median ratio of operating-income-to-sales in Mexico increased 14.5 
percentage points for privatized firms in the competitive sector and only 8.5 points for firms in 
noncompetitive industries. Similarly, competitive firms in Colombia performed relatively better 
than their noncompetitive counterparts as their median profitability decreased by only 2 percentage 
points compared to the 13-point drop for noncompetitive sectors that underwent severe 
deregulation. In Chile, although the noncompetitive sectors’ profitability increased more (8.5 
percentage points), it is not statistically different from the 5.5-percentage-point increase in 
competitive sectors. Data for Peru reinforce this trend as firms in noncompetitive sectors increased 
their profitability by an average of 27 percentage points while the mean increase in the whole 
sample was 32 percentage points. 
Regression analysis for Peru and Bolivia using concentration proxies also helps us assess 
the role of market power. Confirming the trend above, market concentration in both countries was 
found not to be a significant determinant of profits. Finally, information on firms’ product prices 
before and after privatization in Mexico also suggests that market power is not a large source of 
gains. Cumulative price increases in the noncompetitive sector in Mexico were only 6 percent 
higher than the growth of the industry-matched PPI index over the post-privatization period. La 
Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) use this product price data to draw a quick calculation of the 
contribution of changes in prices to the observed change in profitability of the whole sample of 
privatized firms. Their data show that price increases accounted for only 5 (7) percent of the 
change in mean (median) operating-income-to-sales after privatization.
18 If market power were an 
                                                           
17 Firms are classified as competitive and noncompetitive as follows: (1) for Chile, firms are classified as non-
competitive if they are in telecommunications, electricity or social services sectors; (2) for Colombia, noncompetitive 
firms are those in the energy sector; (3) for Mexico, firms are classified based on the description of the industry 
provided in the privatization prospectus of the firm; and (4) for Peru, the noncompetitive sector comprises firms in the 
electricity, financial and telecommunications sectors and the data under “competitive” industries shows the numbers 
for the whole sample instead. The data for Peru refer to mean rather than median values.  
18 To isolate the contribution of changes in relative prices as a factor behind the observed profitability gains, the 
calculation compares the observed percentage-point increase in operating-income-to-sales with what would have taken 
place if privatized firms had increased output but left real prices unchanged at pre-privatization levels. Specifically, the 
formula used for the price contribution is  
 
  22important source of profits for privatized firms, those in noncompetitive sectors would be expected 
to show lower growth in employment, investment and output than firms in competitive sectors (see 
La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999). Available evidence for Latin America does not support 
these claims either (see Figure 15). In Mexico and Colombia, employment dropped 46 and 24 
percent for firms in the competitive sector, and it only decreased 19 and 10 percent for 
noncompetitive firms, respectively. In Chile, the pattern is even more striking: employment 
actually increased in both sectors, rising 16 percent in competitive industries and 32 percent in 
noncompetitive sectors. For Peru, employment data show no divergence in results between 
competitive and non-competitive sectors as the latter declined by 50 percent while employment 
fell 51 percent for the whole sample. Output growth data for Mexico and Peru reinforce this trend. 
In Peru, output growth for both sectors was very similar with noncompetitive firms increasing 
sales 47 percent and the sales of the whole sample going up 50 percent. Similarly, in Mexico, 
output of competitive firms increased 56 percent, while sales in the noncompetitive sector went up 
78 percent.  
Additional evidence comes from investment patterns.  Investment-per-employee grew 49 
and 154 percent in the noncompetitive sectors of Mexico and Colombia, respectively. Meanwhile, 
the same ratio grew only 29 percent in competitive sectors of Mexico and stagnated in Colombia’s 
competitive industries. The evidence for Chile here runs in the opposite direction but it is hardly 
conclusive of market power abuse. Although investment-per-employee grew 74 percent in Chile’s 
competitive sectors, it also grew almost 50 percent in noncompetitive industries.  
Overall, the Latin American evidence presented in this section does not support the claim 
that consumer exploitation is a significant source of privatization gains. These studies suggest that 
a large source of the gains may lie in deep firm restructuring that leads to lower costs and higher 
efficiency. Evidence from Chile and Mexico are suggestive of this pattern.  Unit costs in the 
competitive sector fell 3 percent in Chile and 13 percent in Mexico, while those of noncompetitive 
industries decreased 8 percent and 24 percent in each respective country.  To conclude, abuse of 
market power may be an issue for some firms, but the bulk of the evidence suggests it is not the 
main reason explaining privatization gains across the board. 
 
 
4.4.  Other Dimensions of Consumer Welfare beyond the Effect on Prices 
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where Salesap are sales in the post-privatization period, Costap are operating costs in the post-privatization period and π 
is the increase in real prices. 
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poorer distribution and lower quality of goods and services (Bayliss and Hall, 2000; Bayliss, 2001; 
Akram, 2000; Freije and Rivas, 2002; Birdsall and Nellis, 2002). These concerns are significant 
because, for the most part, the poorest segments of society are the main consumers of goods and 
services previously produced by SOEs. The evidence of increased output, firm restructuring and 
prices presented in Sections 3.3 and 4.3 should alleviate some of these concerns, particularly for 
the case of standardized goods and products. Output and price are suitable proxies for measuring 
the availability of most of these goods. However, in the case of services and public utilities, access 
and distribution may still be a concern as some segments of the population may lack access to the 
network and thus may be unable to purchase these services independently of their price. Similarly, 
the quality of services such as water, electricity, telecommunications, or transportation may be 
reduced to try to meet price regulation, for example. In all of these circumstances, consumer 
welfare may suffer as a result of privatization.  
Some review studies of privatization cases are pessimistic about its success in the service 
sector. Bayliss (2002) points to examples of botched privatizations in Puerto Rico and Trinidad 
and Tobago where water privatization led to price hikes and no apparent improvement in 
provision. Similarly, the privatization of the electric sector in the Dominican Republic is claimed 
to have led to more blackouts and higher utility prices, culminating in civil unrest and the deaths of 
several demonstrators. It is evident that one can always find cases of failure and cases of success. 
Therefore, the only true way to address this question is to gather data that allow a more interesting, 
systematic and economically robust analysis. 
A first generation of privatization studies shed light on this subject by analyzing case 
studies in several countries. Galal et al. (1994), for example, analyze 12 privatization cases in 
Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and the United Kingdom, including firms in sectors such as airlines and 
telecommunications. Their results indicate that privatization led to welfare gains of about 25% of 
the pre-privatization sales in 11 of the 12 cases. Early work on the privatization experience in 
Argentina (i.e., Crampes and Estache, 1996; Estache and Rodriguez, 1996; Carbajo and Estache, 
1996) also show significant gains in access to services such as water, power and port 
infrastructure. With regard to telecommunications and railroad infrastructure, Ramamurti (1996 
and 1997) concludes that privatization has had a positive effect in Latin America because it has led 
to a technological overhaul of the sector and increased both access and quality of the services. 
Similarly, Ros (1999) examines the effect of privatization on the telecom sector in 110 countries 
and finds that the transfer of control from the public to the private sector led to significantly higher 
  24teledensity levels. Although the level of competition had a positive effect on industry efficiency, 
only privatization was related to network expansions. 
A new generation of studies has emerged with more detailed data and new econometric 
approaches that seem to corroborate the early results in terms of access and quality. For instance, 
Torero and Pasco-Font (2001) show that the number of telephone lines in Peru increased from 2.9 
to 7.8 per 100 inhabitants and the electrification coefficient jumped from 48 to 70 percent between 
1993 and 1998. Another study by Torero et al. (2003) tests the impact of the privatization of 
telecommunications on the welfare of urban consumers in Peru, showing significant welfare gains 
and dramatic improvements in terms of efficiency, access and quality of service. Similarly, Fischer 
et al. (2003) find improvements in access and service quality in the telecommunications sector in 
Chile, where the number of phone lines in operation increased six fold, bringing teledensity levels 
from 4.7 to 23.1 lines per 100 inhabitants between 1987 and 2001. The average length of the 
waiting period for a new phone line dropped from 416 days in 1993 to only 6 days in 2001, while 
the waiting list for a phone had dropped from a peak of 314,000 households in 1992 to only 32,000 
by 2001.
19 
There are similar examples of improvements in access to water, electricity, 
telecommunications and other services throughout the region that have created benefits beyond 
lower prices. Nonetheless, one may still be concerned about the distributional impacts of the 
increased coverage, as it may not be reaching the poorest sectors of society. Bayliss (2002) 
recognizes that privatization has the potential for welfare enhancing outcomes if it leads to low-
income households gaining access to the service network. However, her review of cases suggests 
that the drive to seek higher profits in the private provision of services will almost invariably lead 
to a loss for the poor. Birdsall and Nellis (2002) also argue that privatization may lead to 
improvements in efficiency and profitability accompanied by worse income distribution and 
wealth.
20 They conclude that the gains in profitability are probably not worth the distributive 
effects they create. 
Again, recent detailed econometric analyses with better samples provide some answers to 
these concerns. Galiani et al. (2002) have some of the best data available for the municipal level in 
Argentina, where about 30 percent of localities privatized water delivery services. Their results 
show a significant increase in the proportion of households connected to water services in 
municipalities that privatized compared to those that did not. Their regression estimates suggest 
                                                           
19 Trujillo et al. (2002) provide evidence for 21 Latin American countries between 1985 and 1998 and find that private 
sector involvement in utilities and transport yielded marginally positive results on GDP per capita. 
  25that as a result of privatization the number of households connected to the water network increased 
by 11.6 percent, excluding Buenos Aires where 98% of households were already connected. 
Similarly, using less comprehensive data from Bolivia, Barja et al. (2002) find that privatization 
increased access to water relative to both the existing trend and the non-privatized areas.  More 
importantly, they find that the relative benefits of water privatization are larger for the poorest 
segments of the population who gained from the largest increases in access. 
Galiani et al. (2003) cleverly design tests that map water delivery to infant mortality in 
order to directly address the concerns about quality after privatization. Their regressions show that, 
controlling for other factors, Argentinean child mortality fell by 5 to 7 percent more in areas that 
privatized water services than those that did not. The effect was larger in the poorest municipalities 
that privatized where child mortality fell 24 percent. Privatization translated into 375 child deaths 
prevented per year. Along a similar line, Mookherjee and McKenzie (2003) provide an overview 
of four studies from Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua that use household surveys to 
measure the impact of privatization on welfare. They conclude that the sale of SOEs brought 
positive welfare effects and that the poorest segments of the population appear to be relatively 
better off. In Argentina, for example, they report falling electricity prices that improved the 
welfare of all income deciles. For Bolivia, they also report welfare gains from increased electricity 
access for all but the top income deciles. The gains exceeded 100 percent for the lowest deciles in 
spite of real price increases. In Nicaragua, although the price of electricity increased, since the 
budget share allocated to electricity is typically low, the welfare loss to households that already 
had access was less than 1 percent of their per capita expenditure. On the other hand, the value of 
gaining access to electricity was positive and of a larger magnitude for lower income deciles who 
had relatively less access before privatization. The net positive impact of electricity privatization 
for these low-income groups reached nearly 16 percent of per-capita expenditure.   
  So far, Sections 3 and 4 have provided evidence that addresses most of the criticisms of 
privatization. What remains unaddressed, however, is how to make sense of the cases of 
privatization failures pointed out by several authors (see Bayliss, 2002 and Birdsall and Nellis, 
2002 for reviews). It will always be possible to find instances of failed privatizations, but we 
should not distort this information and turn it into an argument against privatization itself.  The 
overwhelming evidence showing that it can be done right suggests that we should look for the 
reasons why it failed in certain instances. In the next two sections, we argue that many of these 
failures have two roots: (1) the role of politicians in the privatization process, which may lead to 
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  26corruption, renegotiation and opportunistic behavior; and (2) the lack of an appropriate post-
privatization regulatory and corporate governance framework that sets the boundaries for non-
abusive corporate behavior and facilitates investment.  
 
5.  What is the Best Approach for Selling? Concerns about the Privatization 
Process  
 
Privatization requires heavy government involvement as politicians set up the method and run the 
process through which they end up either “selling their own firms” or “firing themselves or their 
friends” (Perotti, 1995; Biais and Perotti, 2002; Bortolotti, Fantini and Scarpa, 2001; Earle and 
Gehlbach, 2003).  Looking at the privatization process in this light shows the relevance of 
understanding the impact of the process’ characteristics and the opportunities for corruption they 
may provide. Privatization may be the last chance for politicians to appropriate cash flows or 
deliver favors that further their political objectives. There are three areas where the role of the 
politicians in privatization is central: (a) the method of privatization chosen; (b) the restructuring 
of firms before they are sold off; and (c) the types of contracts written. 
 
5.1.  The Method of Privatization 
 
The way the privatization process is carried out is of utmost importance. A successful program can 
increase social welfare and bring about efficiency gains across the board, while a botched process 
may create opportunities for inefficiency and corruption. In Argentina, as in other countries, an 
obscure bidding process raised suspicions of corruption and political favoritism. When 
governments fail to ensure a crystal clear process, the perception of corruption can breed unease 
among the public and may lead to a backlash against privatization. In principle, a clear and 
homogeneous privatization process should be established from the start and special emphasis 
should be placed on making the auction results as transparent as possible. In reality, however, only 
a handful of countries have followed this path. Many fail to establish clear guidelines because their 
privatization programs were originally planned as small affairs or because they lack the necessary 
skills to do so. Alternatively, politicians may have strong incentives to create obscure and arbitrary 
privatization mechanisms that allow them to extract higher rents for themselves or their 
constituencies. Providing systematic evidence of the impact of the privatization process on the sale 
price and subsequent firm performance is difficult though not impossible.  The existing empirical 
literature has taken two approaches to address these issues.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                
for utilities’ privatization than for banks or oil. 
  27The first approach is to use cross-country comparisons. Chong and Riaño (2003), for 
example, analyze 285 privatizations in industrialized and developing countries and find a positive 
relationship between bureaucratic quality, lack of corruption and privatization prices. Their results 
show that, when controlling for macroeconomic conditions and firm characteristics, a 1-point 
increase in the 0-to-10 indices of bureaucratic quality and lack of corruption is associated with a 
10.2 and 9.6 percent increase in the price-per-dollar-of-assets paid in privatizations, respectively. 
Similarly, Bortolotti, Fantini and Scarpa (2001) analyze data for 49 countries and conclude that 
strong legal institutions and adequately developed capital markets substantially contribute to 
successful privatizations. Finally, Chong and Sánchez (2003) provide data for infrastructure 
privatization contracts in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru to show that establishing a clear and 
transparent contractual arrangement helped achieve the privatization objectives set out by these 
governments. In conclusion, these results suggest that the success or failure of privatization 
programs is influenced by the honesty and efficiency of the government and by the simplicity and 
transparency of contractual agreements.  
The second approach to analyzing the impact of the method of privatization is to use 
within-country data. López-de-Silanes (1997) for Mexico and Arin and Okten (2002) for Turkey 
have the advantage of being able to control for potentially omitted variables and therefore provide 
a fuller analysis of the impact of several restructuring measures and privatization mechanisms on 
the net price of SOEs.
21   
The case of Mexico is a good illustration of the impact of specific differences in the 
privatization process since the program lasted over a decade and was executed by different 
administrations. An additional benefit of this sample is that although the general method of first-
price sealed-bid auction was the rule throughout the period, certain firms were privatized with 
specific requirements that provide useful variations to analyze. Between 1982 and 1988, 
privatization was not conducted as a centralized program, allowing each ministry to sell enterprises 
in its realm of operations. The result of this policy was a plethora of requirements for bidders and 
methods of payment. In contrast, the administration that took power in 1988 established a 
                                                           
21 The net price in these studies is defined as the net privatization price (after the costs of privatization and 
restructuring are deducted) divided by the dollar value of the firms’ assets. The benefit of focusing on this measure is 
that it provides a useful framework for comparing across firms and gives a benchmark against which to think about the 
relative price of other privatization goals pursued by the government. Privatization programs are typically designed 
with the aim of pursuing revenue generation, to get out of a fiscal crisis or to serve redistributive purposes. For Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru, the price paid was a crucial motivation in selecting winners for almost all privatized 
SOEs (López-de-Silanes, 1997; Torero, 2002; Anuatti-Neto et al., 2003; Pombo and Ramírez, 2003).  Furthermore, 
economists have generally endorsed the goal of maximizing revenues. Bolton and Roland (1992) show that a policy of 
maximizing net sales revenue is likely to be consistent with a policy of maximizing social welfare since the proceeds 
from the sale can be used to subsidize employment, investment, a social safety net and other public goods.    
  28centralized privatization office and developed a homogenous process, which improved 
transparency by mandating public disclosure of the bidding stages through the press. Econometric 
estimations show that, controlling for macroeconomic and firm-level characteristics, firms 
privatized under the second period sold at a premium of about 15 percent (López-de-Silanes, 
1997). The gains in efficiency due to better coordination and the presumably reduced room for 
corruption and political meddling have a clear mapping in the price received for enterprises sold.  
Econometric work with firm-level data from Mexico also shows that different auction 
requirements make a substantial difference in the net price received by the government for SOEs. 
Firms sold under restrictions banning foreign bidders, requiring a pre-qualification stage or asking 
for cash-only-payments had significantly lower prices per dollar of assets sold. Therefore, there is 
an effect of these requirements that works independently of the fact that they reduce competition in 
the auction; this evidence suggests that idiosyncratic and arbitrary privatization processes come at 
a direct cost to the government in terms of SOE prices. 
The speed at which each privatization takes place may also have an impact on net prices 
raised. The theoretical literature is split between the benefits and costs of a short process. While 
there are potential costs of rushing a sale, such as not attracting enough bidders or not having 
enough time to set up an appropriate regulatory framework, the advocates of a speedy process 
point to the benefits of quickly disposing of money-losing firms and avoiding costly restructuring 
(Coes, 1998). In order to address this issue, the recent literature has tried to measure the impact 
that the length of the privatization process has on the price that is paid for the specific SOE. Some 
believe that a lengthy privatization process should come at no cost since managers’ concern for 
their reputation will lead them to run the firm efficiently (Bolton and Roland, 1992), or that the 
announcement of privatization may improve stakeholders’ incentives and could therefore boost 
company performance (Caves, 1990). On the other hand, if we think of privatization as a process 
similar to the situation of a firm in financial distress, we would expect the privatization 
announcement to be followed by a deterioration of incentives and performance (Altman, 1984; 
Wruck, 1990).  
Within-country firm-level panel data are ideally set up for resolving this dispute. Evidence 
from Mexico and Turkey shows that, controlling for firm and industry characteristics; lengthy 
privatization processes come at a substantial cost to the government. The announcement of 
privatization in these countries brought a considerable deterioration in performance, which is 
  29probably due to the collapse of managers’ incentives, and disgruntled workers who see their 
futures as highly uncertain (López-de-Silanes, 1997; Arin and Okten, 2002).
22 
 
5.2.  Restructuring Firms prior to Privatization  
 
Government restructuring of SOEs prior to their sale is an issue that is likely to be fraught with 
political difficulties since this is probably the last chance for government officials to extract 
benefits. As with other policies, restructuring programs can be defended rationally on grounds that 
they may increase revenues from the sale, or may ensure that firms are sent out to the market in the 
best conditions to minimize layoffs and secure their survival (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989; Kikeri et al., 
1992; Kikeri, 1999). As a result, there is great ambivalence about the optimal policy approach 
towards restructuring prior to privatization.  
López-de-Silanes (1997) summarizes the theoretical arguments for and against various 
measures of prior-restructuring and suggests that the issue should be resolved empirically. 
However, even with firm-level data this is not a straightforward proposition as restructuring 
measures are not undertaken randomly, but are selectively targeted to firms that need them most. 
We would expect the government to absorb debt of highly indebted SOEs, to fire workers when 
firms face serious over-employment and to invest in new machinery when production processes 
are outdated. If the endogenous nature of these measures is not considered, we run the risk of 
reaching the wrong conclusions as regression coefficients would capture not only the effect of the 
restructuring measure, but also the negative effects of being in distress or having a bloated 
workforce.  
Available empirical evidence strongly suggests that restructuring policies do not lead to 
better net prices per dollar of assets sold. For the case of Mexico, López-de-Silanes (1997) shows 
that, after controlling for endogeneity, the optimal policy seems to be to refrain as much as 
possible from engaging in SOE restructuring. Some of the most popular measures, such as debt 
absorption, do not increase net prices, while measures such as the establishment of investment and 
efficiency programs actually reduce net prices. These facts may be the result of politicians 
themselves carrying out the restructuring programs and emphasizing their political preferences 
when deciding what to invest in and what to do with existing infrastructure. It is disingenuous to 
think that the government can satisfy the desires of the new owners better that they could 
themselves. In Mexico’s case, a few changes to the privatization mechanism could have yielded 
                                                           
22 The evidence for the case of Turkey should only be regarded as tentative since the lack of data has, so far, prevented 
a robust instrumental variables analysis for this country. 
  30large benefits: an emphasis on speed, firing the CEO before privatization and refraining from other 
costly restructuring measures would have increased net prices by 135 percent. A similar study by 
Chong and Galdo (2002) analyzes a cross-country sample of telecommunications firms that were 
privatized between 1985 and 2000, showing that ordinary least squares and instrumental variables 
regressions yield no evidence that streamlining before privatization is linked to higher net prices. 
Finally, evidence from Turkey (Arin and Okten, 2002) also supports the conclusion that 
restructuring measures are either useless or counterproductive in raising net prices.  
One of the most sensitive topics in the area of firm restructuring prior to privatization is 
that of labor force retrenchment. In order to analyze the impact of such retrenchment policies 
beyond their effects on privatization prices, Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c) construct a 
worldwide privatization database containing detailed pre-privatization firm and labor force 
characteristics, labor restructuring measures undertaken by the government and information on 
post-privatization labor re-hiring policies, among other things. Table 3 shows that in spite of heavy 
unionization rates, most governments around the world downsize the labor force of SOEs before 
privatization. In 78 percent of the sample there was labor retrenchment, while only 33 percent of 
all firms underwent voluntary downsizing programs. Employment guarantees were established as 
part of privatization in 28 percent of the cases while pay cuts before privatization were very 
infrequent (7.5 percent). Asia is the only region of the world with significantly lower frequency of 
labor downsizing before privatization. Governments in Latin America deviated little from this 
pattern; the only notable exception is the low frequency of employment guarantees, which was 
only used in 8 percent of all firms privatized in the region. Table 3 also shows that Latin American 
SOEs were heavily unionized and active: two-thirds of SOEs privatized in the region experienced 
labor strikes in the three years before privatization. 
Following the methodology in Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c), we ran OLS and 
instrumental variables regressions for the 94 SOEs privatized in Latin America to test if labor 
restructuring policies in this region mapped into higher net prices per dollar of firm sales.
23  The 
first column of Table 4 shows the OLS results, suggesting that labor downsizing before 
privatization has a significant negative impact equivalent to 28 percent of the average net price per 
dollar of sales. The instrumental variables’ results in column 2 shows that once we control for 
                                                           
23 The net price is calculated as the cash that accrues to the government after all privatization and restructuring costs 
are taken into account. This number is adjusted by the percentage of the firm’s shares sold and divided by the average 
of net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The sample for Latin America includes firms in the following 
countries: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Vincent, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. 
  31endogeneity, the coefficient drops essentially to zero and loses all significance.
24  The results for 
Latin America reflect those for other regions: labor downsizing before privatization is not priced 
by the buyers. From the point of view of increased government revenues, if an SOE is overstaffed, 
it is probably best for governments to wait and let the new owners make the decisions after they 
buy the firm.  
The other two regressions in Table 4 focus on the effect of labor retrenchment in the form 
of voluntary downsizing programs in which governments offer monetary incentives for workers to 
quit. Even after controlling for endogeneity, voluntary downsizing leads to a marginally significant 
discount in the net price paid by private buyers. This negative effect could potentially be explained 
by adverse selection, as workers with the highest productivity or the best chances of finding 
alternative work are more likely to leave. Voluntary downsizing may therefore hurt firms, tending 
to result in the termination of valuable workers and the retention of less productive ones (Fallick, 
1995; Rama, 1999). As predicted by theoretical models (Kahn, 1985; Diwan, 1994; Jeon and 
Laffont, 1999), and despite the fact that voluntary separation programs are politically palatable, the 
findings here show that these programs may weaken firms and distort the composition of the 
workforce.  
  To shed further light on the “quality of firing” carried out by governments before 
privatization, Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c) collected data on the hiring policies of SOEs 
after privatization. While hiring new workers probably responds to the legitimate business needs of 
privatized firms, re-hiring previously fired workers could mean that the downsizing programs 
before privatization went too far. After all, why else would a firm re-hire a worker that was 
deemed expendable a relatively short time before? Figure 16 shows that close to 45 percent of all 
firms that underwent labor retrenchment programs in the three years prior to privatization hired 
back some of the fired workers after privatization. Across countries, only 10 percent of firms with 
government-run retrenchment programs ended up hiring back some of those workers in the exact 
same positions within 18 months after privatization (re-hire same). Latin America is the region 
with the highest percentage of firms re-hiring workers (53 percent) and re-hiring to the same jobs 
that they had previously held (20 percent). 
                                                           
24 We apply a two-step instrumental variables approach by estimating a non-linear reduced-form equation that 
describes the probability that a particular labor restructuring policy will be implemented. The instruments used are 
classified in two groups: firm-level and macroeconomic-level determinants. The firm-level variables included the 
presence of a leading agent bank, involvement of a ministry before privatization, the political affiliation of unions, and 
sectoral dummies. The macroeconomic variables include the average GDP growth rate and the degree of openness in 
the three years prior to privatization and the legal origin of the country. None of these variables is statistically 
significant when included in the price equation. The F-statistic for the excluded instruments is statistically significant 
at 1 percent in all cases.  
  32  Table 5 analyzes the determinants of the probability that the privatized SOE with labor 
retrenchment programs before privatization would hire new workers (new hires) or old workers 
previously fired by the government (re-hires). Results show that the existence of a voluntary 
downsizing program before privatization does not predict a higher probability of firms hiring new 
workers after privatization (column 1). Meanwhile, a voluntary downsizing program before 
privatization increases by 34 percentage points the probability that the private buyer will re-hire 
some of the workers that were previously fired by the government.
25 
The hiring behavior of firms in the post-privatization period says a great deal about the 
quality of the firing process and provides further evidence against the wisdom of government 
restructuring before privatization. Based on the evidence in this section, governments should think 
hard before restructuring the workforce of to-be-privatized SOEs. The political costs are high, the 
impact on net prices is low, and the firm could end up losing some of its most valuable employees.   
5.3.  Type of Privatization Contract 
 
The type of privatization contract written is another potential area that may leave room for 
opportunistic behavior from politicians and private buyers. The simplest contracts are 
straightforward outright sales of assets in which the government disconnects itself completely from 
the operational future of the privatized firm. Other types of contracts may actually lead to a 
perverse relationship between the privatized firm and the state as managers and bureaucrats 
collude to serve their interests at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. These contracts could 
take the form of the provision of services, the construction of infrastructure projects or the 
establishment of joint ventures between private companies and the government. The common 
element in all of these cases is that the umbilical cord between the government and the firm has not 
been severed, leaving ample room for a complex set of problems. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
develop a theoretical model to help understand the incentives faced by firms in instances of partial 
privatization that may be extended to the situations mentioned above. When privatized firms 
depend significantly on the state, they may not restructure as expected because it is easier for them 
to extract rents from the government than to undergo painful reforms. Politicians, on the other 
hand, have incentives to keep them afloat by subsidizing them and shielding them from 
competition. It is not difficult to imagine that these arrangements persist because they are 
beneficial for both parties, although they reduce social welfare.  As Bayliss (2002) points out, 
water privatization programs in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire are examples of poor deals in which the 
                                                           
25 Regressions control for labor rigidities coming from the collective relations laws from each country as the incidence 
of re-hires after privatization could also reflect the firing costs and rigidities of the labor market. 
  33private sector was able to make substantial profits controlling the distribution and fee collection of 
the service, while the government spent resources maintaining the infrastructure. 
In an attempt to find a solution to the complications that these relationships generate, Engel 
et al. (1999; 2001) analyze the Chilean infrastructure concessions during the 1990s and note that 
franchising programs can provide a better alternative to the traditional approach of full state 
financing for infrastructure projects, particularly for governments that are financially and 
politically constrained. The regulatory framework, however, must be effective in order to reap the 
potential benefits of franchising and avoid falling into hold-up problems in which firms underbid 
to get the contracts but then threaten with bankruptcy if a renegotiation is not granted.  
Empirical evidence provided in Guasch (2001) shows that renegotiations in concessions are 
fairly common. He analyzes over 1,000 concessions granted in Latin American countries during 
the 1990s and finds that over 60 percent of them had been substantially renegotiated within 3 
years. Infrastructure projects are usually very risky because of the difficulty inherent in forecasting 
demand. Therefore, firms usually press for income guarantees and other explicit or implicit 
insurance mechanisms that end up costing the government too much. It may occasionally be in the 
best interest of countries to give out these guarantees, but they should be made in an explicit 
fashion, accounted for transparently and, ideally, provided in exchange for a fee (Engel et al., 
2003). 
In all of these situations the solution should also include very clear disclosure and 
monitoring mechanisms to avoid related-party transactions at unfair terms. Such transactions may 
end up bankrupting the joint venture or the asset that the government has an interest in keeping 
afloat to the benefit of the private corporation, as happened in the case of highways and 
commercial banks in Chile and Mexico (Ramírez, 1998; La Porta, López-de-Silanes and 
Zamarripa, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000). These are not easy issues to solve and many of the failures 
of privatization can be linked to perverse incentives provided by misguided privatization 
concession contracts.      
The evidence in this section can be understood from a political economy perspective. 
Privatization involves politicians with incentives and objectives. Therefore, the design of the 
privatization process and the contracts ultimately written, the restrictions attached to the sale of 
SOEs and the restructuring measures adopted before privatization should be understood as 
opportunities for politicians to extract rents and hand out favors. This perspective helps rationalize 
instances in which corruption in privatization leads to disastrous results. The policy lesson is clear: 
a transparent and expeditious privatization process leaves less room for corruption and collusion 
  34between politicians and businessmen who may try to benefit from opaqueness. Of course, in the 
final analysis, one must also consider the time needed to set up an effective privatization oversight 
agency and build the regulatory framework that should be in place before SOEs with market power 
are sold. We turn to this topic in the next section.   
 
 
6.  Complementary Policies: Re-Regulation and Corporate Governance 
 
The previous section analyzed some of the main failures in privatization emerging from policies or 
decisions taken before or at the time of privatization.  In this section, we turn to the impact of the 
regulatory and institutional framework after privatization. Privatization should not be looked at in 
isolation.  Its success is likely to depend on at least two sets of complementary policies. The first is 
deregulation and re-regulation of sectors with market power or in which government ownership 
represented a substantial percentage of total assets prior to privatization. The second is the 
establishment of a set of institutions that promote good corporate governance facilitating access to 
capital and allowing recently privatized firms to finance their growth without dependence on the 
state. Many privatization failures can be explained by a lack of careful consideration of these two 
complementary sets of policies. 
 
6.1.  Privatization, Re-Regulation and Deregulation  
 
There is no question that an appropriate regulatory framework after privatization is a key 
component of the success or failure of the program, particularly in utilities and services. Based on 
the available evidence, a common element across many failed examples of privatization is 
inadequate regulation leading to sub-optimal levels of competition or allowing producers to keep 
the gains from privatization without sharing them with consumers (Megginson and Netter, 2001; 
Boubakri and Cosset, 1999). The classic position of critics is to turn this into an argument against 
further privatization. However, the ample empirical evidence surveyed here shows that 
privatization can be done correctly, and can lead to social gains. This should be enough to discard 
a simplistic interpretation of cases of failures. 
There are two prominent instances in which regulation should be carefully revised in 
conjunction with privatization: (1) industries characterized as natural monopolies or where 
oligopolistic market structures exist; and (2) industries where the government owns most of the 
assets in the industry even if no individual firm had substantial market power.  Sectors with heavy 
state presence tend to be protected by a web of regulations originally instituted to cut SOE losses 
  35and reduce fiscal deficits. In some of these cases, the regulatory effort needed can be better 
understood as “deregulation” to get rid of protective structures that shield companies from 
competition and could allow privatized firms to make extraordinary gains at the cost of consumers. 
As explained in the early and more recent literature (Yarrow, 1986; Allen and Gale, 1999), 
competition and deregulation should be carefully considered in privatization. Winston (1993) 
argues that deregulation has the power to produce efficiency improvements, which can benefit 
consumers and producers. There is no reason to believe that deregulation should lead to different 
outcomes in the case of privatization of over-protected industries.
26 In cases of sectors with 
oligopolistic power, the deregulation effort needs to be complemented by re-regulation that clearly 
establishes a new package of rules and disclosures to enhance supervision and reduce abuse of 
market power.    
Re-regulation of oligopolistic sectors is complicated because of the weakness in the 
regulatory governance. As Fischer and Serra (2002) explain, regulators are often subject to 
pressures from populist politicians and industry lobbyists, and their low salaries make then 
susceptible to capture. Moreover, regulatory systems often operate within the context of an 
inefficient and perhaps even corrupt judicial system.   
There are two ways in which deregulation complements privatization, as explained in La 
Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999). At the most basic level, product market competition provides a 
tool to weed out the least efficient firms. This process may take too long, or not work at all, if 
regulation inhibits new entry or makes exit costly. Wallsten (2001) undertakes an econometric 
analysis of the effects of telecommunications’ privatization and regulation in a panel of 30 
countries in Latin America and Africa.  His results show that competition from mobile operators 
and privatization combined with the existence of a separate regulator are significantly associated 
with increases in labor efficiency, mainlines per capita and connection capacity.  A casual 
interpretation of his results suggests that privatization of oligopolistic industries without 
concurrent reforms may not necessarily improve welfare. 
Secondly, deregulation may also complement privatization by raising the cost of political 
intervention. Whereas an inefficient monopoly can squander its rents without endangering its 
existence, an inefficient firm in a competitive industry would have to receive a subsidy to stay 
afloat. The introduction of competition forces politicians to have to pay firms directly to engage in 
politically motivated actions whereas before the costs of these measures was absorbed by an SOE 
                                                           
26 For the case of Mexico, La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) find that deregulation—particularly the removal of 
price and/or quantity controls and trade barriers—is linked to faster convergence of privatized firms to industry 
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  36that did not have to worry about market performance. In fact, competition is often restricted 
precisely because it raises the costs of political influence. Colombia and Mexico provide good 
examples of deregulatory policy actions that, when coupled with privatization, can be used as a 
lever to transform the economic landscape and reduce political interference in the economy. In the 
early 1990s, Colombia began an economic openness program through the promotion of market 
competition and deregulation. As Pombo and Ramírez (2003) explain, privatization was conceived 
of as an instrument for economic deregulation and the promotion of market competition. A decade 
earlier, Mexico started to transform its previously closed economy characterized by capital 
controls, price regulation, restrictions on foreign direct investment, high tariffs, import quotas and 
a large state-owned public sector. As in the case of Colombia, privatization coupled with 
deregulation played a key role in the drive to restructure the economy and help privatized SOEs 
catch up to their private peers (La Porta and López-de-Silanes, 1999). 
Generally speaking, re-regulation or deregulation can take place at three different 
moments: before privatization, at the time of privatization or after the SOE has been sold. The 
literature has emphasized the importance of having efficient regulation at an early stage. Re-
regulation or deregulating before privatization of the industry may increase the pace of divestiture 
and help sell companies at a higher price if it reduces regulatory risk as Bortolotti, Fantini and 
Siniscalco (2001) argue for the case of the electric sector. Wallsten (2002) finds that countries that 
established a separate regulatory authority in telecommunications prior to privatization not only 
benefited from increased telecom investment and telephone penetration, but also gained from 
investors’ willingness to pay more for the telecom firms.
27 However, it is not easy to establish 
effective pre-privatization regulation for at least three reasons: First, changes to the regulatory 
regime prior to privatization are likely to lower SOE profits, translating into higher financial needs 
for the government at a very difficult time. Second, without the pressure of imminent privatization, 
the political will for a true regulatory reform might not materialize. Finally, governments with little 
experience in privatization often find it difficult to carry out an effective pre-privatization 
regulatory reform.   
Deregulation and re-regulation at the time of privatization, clarifying the new set of rules, 
solves the first two problems and reduces regulatory risk discounts. There is evidence that as long 
as a suitable regulatory framework is in place at or before the time of privatization, consumers and 
the government should benefit from the process. Chisari et al. (1999) use a computable general 
equilibrium model for Argentina to show that the gains from efficient regulation are non-trivial. 
                                                           
27 Chong and Galdo (2003) find similar results. 
  37Their model estimated the gains from the private operation of utilities at about 0.9 percent of GDP 
and those of effective regulation at an additional 0.35 percent of GDP. Moreover, they find that the 
distribution of the gains across income classes is driven by the effectiveness of the regulators. In 
short, their claim is that clear re-regulation is good for the poor.  
Lack of regulatory capabilities at the time of privatization coupled with a desire to 
maximize price at the time of the sale has led several governments to postpone full and clear re-
regulation. Trying to establish an adequate regulatory scheme after privatization may be 
problematic from a political economy perspective. Since the agency in charge of enforcing and 
regulating the contracts is often the same or a subordinated entity to the agency that carried out the 
privatization, there is an incentive for lax enforcement to avoid exposing past mistakes. Chong and 
Sánchez (2003) document that for a broad number of concessions in infrastructure projects, the 
private sector was able to bargain and keep protective regulation after privatization because of the 
threat of bankruptcy, withdrawal, or desertion of future investment commitments. All of these 
impact the reputation and credibility of privatizing politicians. According to the evidence in 
Guasch (2001), in the last 15 years, concession contracts in developing countries have often led to 
renegotiations. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 40 percent of all concession contracts were 
renegotiated just over 2.2 years after they were signed. Engel et al. (2003) argue that opportunistic 
renegotiations of concessions are common because of a “privatize now, regulate later” approach. 
Cost overruns in concessions and unclear rules governing contingencies provide private owners 
with the opportunity to extract economic rents from the government. Finally, attempting to 
substantially alter the regulatory framework after the sale may also prove difficult as new 
constituencies against re-regulation are created at the time of privatization. Shareholders and 
managers of privatized SOEs are joined by workers and even consumers who could benefit from 
the protective regulatory status of firms.  
The political economy approach explains why it is hard to bring about changes in 
regulation after privatization and why privatized firms are frequently able to renegotiate their 
contracts on more favorable terms. In this context, we believe that it is advisable to push for 
changes in the regulatory framework at the time of privatization or earlier if possible. However, 
one needs to be aware that perfection in developing the new regulatory framework may require a 
lot of time and this should not be used as an excuse for postponing the privatization of money-
losing entities.  
 
6.2.  Privatization and Corporate Governance 
 
  38The last issue we would like to address in this paper is the connection between the success of 
privatization and the establishment of an institutional framework that promotes good corporate 
governance. The absence of this framework increases the cost of capital, preventing privatized 
firms from undertaking the investments needed to operate in a more competitive environment. The 
access to alternative sources of finance at low cost allows firms to survive and grow without state 
help. 
The development and appropriate functioning of stock and credit markets needs a solid 
regulatory framework that promotes investor protection and disclosure. Recent research has shown 
a strong link between firms’ access to capital and laws efficiently enforced (La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 1998; 2002; La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003). In 
countries where large numbers of firms have been sent out to the private market and deregulation 
has increased competition and lowered trade barriers, there is an urgent need for institutions that 
can efficiently channel resources to the new private sector. While the old laws and institutions 
might have been efficient in covering the needs of SOEs, private enterprises and privatized firms 
require different services and stand to benefit from the development of deep stock and credit 
markets. Ariyo and Jerome (1999) argue that the absence of developed capital markets and the lack 
of appropriate legal and judicial structures have hindered the success of privatization in Africa. 
Before privatization, government banks are typically used as a source of financing. Yet in 
most privatization programs, the banking sector is one of those turned over to private hands. If 
financing for privatized SOEs is expected to come from privatized banks, or from any other private 
credit institution, there is an urgent need to make sure that creditor rights, embedded in bankruptcy 
laws, and the efficiency of courts are strengthened and streamlined. Without proper bankruptcy 
procedures that allow for the expedient recovery of assets, financial institutions will be reluctant to 
lend in fear of potential losses and may end up failing to satisfy the financial needs of the private 
sector. Moreover, the banking system itself is rendered more vulnerable to crises without effective 
creditor rights as it loses its ability to repossess collateral expediently (La Porta, López-de-Silanes 
and Zamarripa, 2003).  
The development of large stock markets where firms can access long-term funds is also an 
important complementary measure to privatization. In some cases, governments have provided a 
boost to stock markets by privatizing SOEs through initial public offerings.  However, this is not 
enough to ensure the development of the market and its usefulness as a source of future financing 
for these firms. Privatization without a commitment to improve shareholder rights in corporate and 
securities laws will probably lead to widespread abuse and appropriation of benefits by managers 
  39or those in control with only small gains for minority investors in the form of dividends, for 
example.
28 The failure to institute appropriate securities laws and effective enforcement may be 
responsible for many of the scandals that are now blamed on privatization in the Czech Republic, 
for example (Dyck, 2001; Glaeser et al., 2001). An additional benefit of corporate governance 
reform is that the improvement in disclosures and accounting standards facilitates the work of 
regulators. As Carey et al. (1994) and Campos-Méndez et al. (2001) argue, post-privatization 
regulators end up relying on standard accounting data instead of imposing specific regulatory 
accounting needs. If this is the case, enhanced accounting standards, particularly in the area of 
disclosure of related-party transactions and situations of conflict of interest, should be of great 
benefit to regulators of privatized firms.  
The reform of corporate governance institutions through the establishment and enforcement 
of effective securities, corporate and bankruptcy laws should become an essential complementary 
policy in order to prevent expropriation by controlling investors and to promote the development 
of stable sources of funds to which privatized firms can turn to finance their growth. We should 
not forget that many financially troubled private firms became state-owned in the last 50 years as a 
result of the limited access to capital that pushed them to seek government financing (López-de-
Silanes, 1994). 
 
7. Conclusions   
 
The push for privatization and the drive to restructure the role of the state in production have lost 
their appeal. Public opinion and policymakers in Latin America and other regions of the world 
have turned against privatization, and a large political backlash to privatization has been brewing 
for some time. The goal of this paper is to help set the privatization record straight by analyzing 
systematic evidence emerging from comprehensive studies around the world. In this quest, we 
benefit from a recent series of academic papers focusing on the Latin American experience. Due to 
their extensive coverage and systematic econometric approach, these papers are able to address the 
series of concerns voiced against privatization.  
The evidence lines up: countries that privatize benefit and the gains are not only kept by 
firm owners—they are also distributed to society. These findings do not mean that failures do not 
occur, but rather that they are not the norm. Most instances of failure can be explained by three 
factors. First, opaque processes with heavy state involvement open up the door to corruption and 
                                                           
28 See La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000b; La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003; and 
López-de-Silanes, 2002. 
  40opportunistic behavior.  Second, poor contract design and regulatory capture are linked to a lack of 
deregulation and inadequate re-regulation. Third, deficient corporate governance institutions raise 
the cost of capital, hamper restructuring efforts and may throw firms back into the hands of the 
state. The understanding of the political economy mechanisms behind the causes of failure should 
be used to improve privatization, not to stop it.  
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RECENT STUDIES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AFTER PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Study  Sample, Period and Methodology  Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
Birch and Haar 
(2000) 
A descriptive study of the privatization 
experience in the last two decades in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and some 
Caribbean countries. 
  The authors find sizeable effects of privatization 
on the macroeconomic conditions (both in the 
short and long run). They also show a positive 
effect of privatization on productivity and a 
negative effect on employment. 
Chisari, Estache and 
Romero (1999) 
The study assesses macroeconomic and 
distributional effects of privatization in 
Argentina’s gas, electricity, 
telecommunications, and water sectors. It 
uses a computable general equilibrium 
model. 
  The study concludes that effective regulation 
translates into annual gains of about 1.25 billion 
of GDP. Privatization cannot be blamed for 
increased unemployment as it may be due to 
ineffective regulation. 
Chong and Sánchez 
(2003) 
A detailed analysis of the contractual 
arrangements of privatizations and 
concessions in infrastructure. It covers four 
countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Peru. 
  It concludes that clear, homogeneous, 
transparent and credible institutional processes 
during privatization yield positive outcomes. 
Clarke and Cull 
(2001) 
This study uses evidence from the 
privatization program of provincial banks 
in Argentina during the 1990s. It tests 
econometrically how political constraints 
affect transactions during bank 
privatization. 
  It finds that provinces with high fiscal deficits 
were willing to, first, accept layoffs; and 
second, to guarantee a larger part of the 





It compares post-privatization performance 
of 12 large firms from Chile and Mexico. 
The companies covered are mostly airlines 
and regulated utilities. 
  This study finds net welfare gains in 11 of 12 
cases covered. Gains are on average equal to 26 
percent of the firms’ pre-divestiture sales.  It 
finds no case where workers were made worse 




This study analyzes the difference in 10 
performance indicators of 144 private, 
public and privatized firms in Chile during 
the period from 1974-1987. 
  It finds no significant differences in behavior 
among public, private and privatized firms that 
operate under similar sets of rules and 
regulations. 
La Porta and López-
de-Silanes (1999) 
The authors test whether performance of 
most Mexican SOEs privatized through 
June 1992 improves after divestment. They 
compare firms' performance with an 
industry-matched control group. They split 
performance improvements documented 
between industry and firm-specific 
influences. 
  This study finds that the output of privatized 
firms increased by more than 50 percent; 
employment declined by half, though wages for 
remaining workers increased. Firms achieved 
about a 25 percent increase in operating 
profitability, eliminating the need for subsidies, 
which equal 12.7 percent of GDP. Higher 
product prices explain 5 percent of the 
improvement, transfers from laid-off workers 
31 percent, and incentive-related productivity 
gains explain the remaining 64 percent. 
Petrazzini and Clark 
(1996) 
Using International Telecommunications 
Union data through 1994, it tests whether 
deregulation and privatization impact the 
level and growth of teledensity, prices, 
service quality and employment. The 
sample covers 26 developing countries, 
including some Latin American nations. 
  Deregulation and privatization are both 
associated with significant improvements in the 
level and growth of teledensity, but have no 
consistent impact on the quality of service. 
Deregulation is associated with lower prices and 
increased employment; privatization has the 
opposite effect. 
  53Study  Sample, Period and Methodology  Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
Pinheiro (1996)  It analyzes the performance of 50 former 
Brazilian SOEs before and after 
privatization. It uses data up until 1994. 
The variables used are net sales, net profits, 
net assets, investment, employment and 
indebtedness. 
  The study concludes that privatization has 
improved the performance of the firms. It shows 
that the null hypothesis of no change in 
behavior is rejected for the production, 
efficiency, profitability and investment 
variables. It finds a significant negative impact 
on employment. 
Ramamurti (1996)  It surveys 4 telecoms, 2 airlines, and 1 toll-
road privatization program during 1987-
1991. It discusses political economic 
issues, methods used to overcome 
bureaucratic/ideological opposition to 
divestiture. 
  It concludes that privatization had positive 
results for telecoms, partly due to the scope for 
improvement of technology, capital investment, 
and attractiveness of offer terms. In the case of 
the airlines and toll road there was less room for 
productivity enhancement, and thus little 
improvement is observed. 
Ramamurti  (1997)  Examines the restructuring and 
privatization of Ferrocarriles Argentinos in 
1990. It tests whether productivity, 
employment, and the need for operating 
subsidies change after divestiture. 
  It documents a 370 percent improvement in 
labor productivity and a 78.7 percent decline in 
employment. Services were expanded and 
improved, and delivered at lower cost to 
consumers. The need for operating subsidies 
was largely eliminated. 
Ros (1999)  Uses ITU data and panel data regressions 
to examine the effects of privatization and 
competition on network expansion and 
efficiency. The study covers 110 countries 
during the 1986-1995 period. 
  Countries with at least 50 percent of private 
ownership in the main telecom firm have 
significantly higher teledensity levels and 
growth rates. Both privatization and 
competition increase efficiency. However, only 
privatization is positively associated with 
network expansion. 
Sánchez and Corona 
(1993) 
Uses a descriptive case-study approach to 
analyze the privatization experiences of 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. It 
focuses on the preparatory measures taken 
prior to privatization; on valuation, sale 
mechanisms, regulation and supervision, 
and on the fiscal and macroeconomic 
impact of privatization. 
  The authors find great differences in the effects 
of privatization in the countries covered by the 
study. They conclude that firms, institutions and 
regulations need sufficient time to prepare for 




This study uses a sample of 21 Latin 
American countries covering from 1985 to 
1998. It uses pooled and panel data with 
fixed and random effects to examine the 
macroeconomic effects of private sector 
participation in infrastructure. 
  The authors find that private sector involvement 
in utilities and transport have minimal positive 
effects on GDP. There is crowding out of 
private investment, private participation reduces 
recurrent expenditures except in transport where 
it has the opposite effect. The net effect on the 
public sector account is uncertain. 
Wallsten  (2001)  Analyses the effect of telecommunication 
reforms. It explores the impact of 
privatization, competition, and regulation 
on telecom firms' performance. This study 
covers 30 African and Latin American 
countries during the 1984-1997 period.  
 It indicates that competition is significantly 
associated with increases in per capita access to 
telecommunication services and with decreases 
in its costs. Privatization is helpful only if 
coupled with effective, independent regulation. 
The study concludes that competition combined 
with privatization is best. Privatizing a 
monopoly without regulatory reforms should be 
avoided. 
 
          Sources: Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003a) and Megginson and Netter (2001) 
.
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IDB PROJECT: FIRM PERFORMANCE AFTER PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 






It covers 21 federal non-financial SOEs 
plus all privatized banks in Argentina. 
This coverage equals 74% of the total 
privatization revenues. It tests whether 
performance indicators of SOEs 














   
Profitability of non-financial firms 
increased 188% after privatization. 
Employment decreased approximately 
40% as a result of privatization. 
Investment increased at least 350% 





It covers 32 firms, which account for 60%
of total transactions in Bolivia. This study 











SOEs improved after privatization. 
Period: 1992-1999.   
Privatization did not have a significant 
impact on profitability, but increased 
operating efficiency (142%) and 
decreased employment (85%), 





It includes 102 publicly traded firms 













transactions in the country). It tests 
whether performance indicators improved 
after privatization. Period: 1987-2000.   
Privatization improved the firms’ 
profitability (14%) and reduced their 







Due to political and economic turbulence 
during the 1970s and changes in 
accounting standards, this study covers 
only 37 non-financial firms. It tests 
whether performance indicators improved 














   
It finds no significant increase in 
profitability after privatization. There is 
no difference between the regulated and 
unregulated sectors in productivity. It 
concludes that there is no evidence that 
firms fired workers after privatization. 





It analyses 30 former IFI Program firms, 
which account for 95% of the total 
accumulated privatization sales. This 
study tests whether performance 















   
Firms were profitable before 
privatization. Labor productivity grew 
13% and investment fell from 5.9 to 
2.5% per year due to previous over
investment. Employment was reduced 






An assessment of whether the 
performance of 218 privatized SOEs 
improved after divestment. It compares 
performance with industry-matched 
firms, and splits improvements 
documented between industry and firm-



















   
The output of privatized firms 
increased 54.3%, while employment 
declined by half (though wages for 
remaining workers increased). Firms 
achieved a 24% point increase in 
operating profitability, eliminating need 
for subsidies that amounted to 12.7% of
GDP. Higher product prices explain 5% 
of improvements: transfers from laid-
off workers, 31% and incentive-related 
productivity gains the remaining 64% 









  This study covers 36 non-financial 
firms, which account for 90% of 
privatization cases and 86% of total 
transactions. In addition, it includes a 
separate analysis for the financial sector. 
It tests whether performance indicators 
improved after privatization. Period: 
1986-2000.  
  Profitability, operational efficiency 
and output increased after 
privatization. The ratio of sales to 
employees increased by 50% in 
telecommunications, 69% in 
electricity and 25% in the financial 
sector. After privatization 36% of 
employees retained their jobs. 
 
          Source: Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003a) 
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TABLE 3. 











           
Downsizing 82.2%  58.3%  79.7% 79.2% 76.2%  78.2% 
Voluntary  downsizing  32.5%  12.5%  45.3% 28.6% 14.3%  32.5% 
Employment  guarantee  8.4%  20.1%  51.6% 13.0% 52.4%  28.2% 
Pay cut  8.9%  0.0%  1.6%  13.0%  7.1%  7.5% 
Unions 92.1%  58.3%  81.2%  83.1%  88.1%  84.4% 
Strikes   66.3%  29.2%  45.3%  29.8%  47.6%  47.4% 
Number of Firms  101  24  64  77  42  308 
 
This table presents the percentage of firms, grouped by region, that engaged in labor restructuring. The variables are defined as 
follows: (1) Downsizing, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm undertook any downsizing of the labor force up to 
three years prior to privatization and zero otherwise. Downsizing may be classified as voluntary or compulsory, and may be 
targeted according to age (age-biased downsizing), skills (skill-biased downsizing), gender (female-biased downsizing), or may 
be neutral (no particular group targeted). (2) Voluntary Downsizing, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the SOE 
reduced its labor force in an exclusively non-coercive manner during the three years prior to privatization and zero otherwise. 
The most common methods of voluntary downsizing are incentive-based measures such as severance packages and pension 
enhancements. (3) Employment Guarantee, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the SOE made any promise regarding the 
employment status of workers during the three years prior to privatization and zero otherwise; (4) Pay Cut, which is a dummy 
variable equal to one if there were any reductions in the salary or wage of workers during the three years prior to privatization 
and zero otherwise. (5) Unions, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the SOE had a union up to three years prior to 
privatization and zero otherwise. (6) Strikes, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the SOE suffered any kind of protest 
such as picketing or strikes in the three years prior to privatization. 
 
Source: Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c). 
 
 
  56TABLE 4. 
LABOR RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION PRICES IN LATIN AMERICA  
_________________________________________________________________________________   
Dependent Variable: Net Price  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.- Firm and privatization characteristics:
Net total liabilities 0.0176 0.0168 0.0216 0.0153
























(0.033)             (0.036)     (0.033)     (0.038)    
2.- Labor Characteristics:
Unions -0.1592 -0.1821 -0.1878 -0.1814
(0.131)             (0.149)     (0.122)     (0.143)    
3.-  Labor Policies:
Downsizing -0.1683
a -0.0201




(0.038)     (0.032)    
4.- Macroeconomic Variable:











(0.334)             (0.341)     (0.311)     (0.350)    
Observations 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.47 0.38 0.53 0.41
F 11.36 10.32 11.59 12.35
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IV Variables OLS IV OLS
 
a = significant at 1 percent; b = significant at 5 percent; c = significant at 10 percent. 
The dependent variable is the “net price” which is defined as the amount that accrues to the government from the sale of the SOE, 
after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and divided 
by the average net sales of the SOE during the three years prior to its privatization. The independent variables are defined as 
follows: (1) Net total liabilities, which is a dummy variable equal to one if net total liabilities of the firm were greater than zero up 
to three years prior to privatization and zero otherwise; (2) Dummy variables for sectors (Mining, Industry and Services) equal to 
one if the SOE is part of that sector and zero otherwise; (3) Foreign, which is a dummy variable equal to one if foreign firms were 
allowed to bid on the sale of the SOE and zero otherwise; (4) Unions, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the SOE had a 
union up to three years prior to privatization and zero otherwise; (5) Downsizing, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
firm undertook any downsizing of the labor force up to three years prior to privatization and zero otherwise. Downsizing may be 
classified as voluntary or compulsory, and may be targeted according to age (age-biased downsizing), skills (skill-biased 
downsizing), gender (female-biased downsizing), or may be neutral (no particular group targeted). (6) Voluntary downsizing, 
which is a dummy variable equal to one if the SOE reduced its labor force in an exclusively non-coercive manner during the three 
years prior to privatization and zero otherwise. The most common methods of voluntary downsizing are incentive-based measures 
such as severance packages and pension enhancements. (7) Gross Domestic Product, which is the log of the average GDP in the 
country (in US dollars at purchasing power parity) during the three years prior to privatization. All regressions include firm size 
controls. Columns (1) and (3) provide estimates from OLS regressions, while Columns (2) and (4) show the second stage of the 
two-step instrumental variable procedure used in order to account for the endogenous nature of the labor downsizing variables. The 
instrumental variable approach is carried out according to the procedure outlined in Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c). Robust 
standard errors are given in parentheses.  
Source: Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c). 
  57TABLE 5.  
RE-HIRES AND NEW HIRES IN PRIVATIZED FIRMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Probit dF/dX Probit dF/dX
(1) (2)
Voluntary downsizing 0.6035 [0.1600] 0.9004b [0.3370]
(0.3835) (0.3826)
Strikes 0.6026 [0.1408] 1.0382b [0.3961]
(0.4309) (0.4235)
Foreign Participation -0.3092 [-0.0852] -0.2469 [-0.0943]
(0.4074) (0.3879)





Log likelihood -29.49 -33.99
Wald chi2 6.58 13.60
Dependent Variable:   
Re-hires




a = significant at 1 percent; b = significant at 5 percent; c = significant at 10 percent. 
The dependent variables are defined as follows: (1) New hires, which is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the privatized firm hired new workers up to 18 months after privatization, and zero otherwise; (2) 
Re-hires, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the privatized firm re-hired previously fired 
workers up to 18 months after privatization, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are defined 
as follows: (1) Voluntary downsizing, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the SOE cut its labor 
force in an exclusively non-coercive manner during the three years prior to privatization, and zero 
otherwise. The most common methods of voluntary downsizing are incentive-based measures such as 
severance packages and pension enhancements. (2) Strikes, which is a dummy variable equal to one if 
there were any protests, picketing or strikes up to three years prior to privatization, and zero otherwise. 
(3) Foreign, which is a dummy variable equal to one if foreign firms were allowed to bid for the SOE, 
and zero otherwise. (4) the collective relations laws index ranges from 0 to 3 and measures the level of 
protection granted to workers by labor and employment laws (higher values of the index represent 
more stringent laws regarding worker protection). It measures the areas of collective bargaining, 
worker participation in management, and collective disputes. All regressions include a partial 
privatization dummy, sectoral dummies and country macro controls. Standard errors and marginal 
effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively. 
 
Sources: Data collected by the authors; Botero et al. (2003); and Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c). 
  58FIGURE 1. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES   
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  60FIGURE 3. 
PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990-2000 
(REVENUES FROM PRIVATIZATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF 1999 GDP) 
 


























   Source: Lora (2001). 
  61FIGURE 4. 
AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATIZATION DATA IN LATIN AMERICA 
 



































































Panel A shows the value of transactions included in the studies as a percentage of the total value of privatization 
transactions in each country. Panel B shows the number of privatization contracts included in the studies as a 
percentage of the total number of privatization contracts in the country.  
 
Sources: Galiani et al. (2003); Garrón et al. (2003); Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003); Pombo and Ramírez (2003); Fischer et 
al. (2003); Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003a and 2003b); and Torero (2002). 
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Sources: Galiani et al. (2003); Garrón et al. (2003); Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003); Fischer et al. (2003); Pombo and 
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The figure presents the median change in the net-income-to-sales ratio and the operating-income-to-sales ratio after 
privatization. The components of the variables are defined as follows: (1) Net income is equal to operating income 
minus interest expenses and net taxes paid, as well as the cost of any extraordinary items; (2) Operating income is equal 
to sales minus operating expenses, minus cost of sales, and minus depreciation; and (3) Sales are equal to the total 
value of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts. 
 
Sources: Galiani et al. (2003); Garrón et al. (2003); Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003); Fischer et al. (2003); Chong and López-
de-Silanes (2003b); and Torero (2002). 
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Cost-per- Unit Sales-to-assets Sales-per-employees  
 
The figure presents the median change in the cost-per-unit ratio, the sales-to-assets ratio and the sales-per-employees 
ratio for each country after privatization. Cost-per-unit is defined as the ratio of cost of sales to sales. The components 
of the variables are defined as follows: (1) Cost of sales is equal to the direct expense involved in the production of a 
good (or provision of a service), including raw material expenditure plus total compensation paid to blue-collar 
workers; (2) Sales are equal to the total value of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales 
returns and discounts; (3) Employees corresponds to the total number of workers (paid and unpaid) who depend 
directly on the company; and (4) Assets are defined as property, plant and equipment (PPE), which is equal to the value 
of a company’s fixed assets adjusted for inflation. For Brazil, the sales-per-employees ratio is not available. For 
Bolivia, cost-per-unit information is not available. 
 
Sources: Garrón et al. (2003); Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003); Fischer et al. (2003); Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003b); 
and Torero (2002). 
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 EMPLOYMENT CHANGES AFTER PRIVATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 




































































Number of employees Industry-adjusted number of employees
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Number of employees Industry-adjusted number of employees
 
 
The figure presents the percentage change in the number of employees and the industry-
adjusted number of employees after privatization for each country. Panel A shows mean 
values; Panel B shows median values. The number of employees corresponds to the total 
number of workers (paid and unpaid) who depend directly on the company. The industry-
adjusted number of employees is computed by augmenting the pre-privatization number by the 
difference between the cumulative growth rate of the number of employees of the firm and the 
cumulative growth rate of the number of employees of the control group in the post-
privatization period relative to the average number of employees before privatization. For 
Argentina the mean number of employees information is not available; for Chile and Peru the 
median industry-adjusted information is not available. 
  66Sources: Galiani et al. (2003); Garrón et al. (2003); Fischer et al. (2003); Pombo and Ramírez 
(2003); Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003b); and Torero (2002). 
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The figure presents the median change in output and industry-adjusted output after privatization for each country. 
Output is defined as the monetary value of sales. The industry-adjusted output is computed by augmenting the pre-
privatization value by the difference between the cumulative growth rate of output of the firm and the cumulative 
growth rate of output of the control group in the post-privatization period relative to the average level of output before 
privatization. For Colombia, the information corresponds to mean values; for Peru, industry-adjusted output 
information is expressed in mean values; for Argentina and Chile output information is not available. 
 
Sources: Galiani et al. (2003); Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003); Fischer et al. (2003); Pombo and Ramírez (2003); Chong and 
López-de-Silanes (2003b); and Torero (2002). 
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Before privatization After privatization
 
 
The figure presents the net-income-to-sales gap between privatized SOEs and private firms, before and after 
privatization. The components of the net-income-to-sales ratio are defined as follows: (1) Net income is equal to 
operating income minus interest expenses and net taxes paid, as well as the cost of any extraordinary items; and (2) 
Sales are equal to the total value of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and 
discounts. For Colombia information is from the energy sector.   
 
Sources: Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003); Fischer et al. (2003); Pombo and Ramírez (2003); and Chong and López-de-
Silanes (2003b). 
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Before privatization After privatization
 
 
The figure presents the cost-per-unit gap between privatized SOEs and private firms, before and after privatization. 
Cost-per-unit is defined as the ratio of costs of sales to net sales. The components of the cost-per-unit ratio are defined 
as follows: (1) Cost of sales is equal to the direct expense involved in the production of a good (or provision of a 
service), including raw material expenditure plus total compensation paid to blue-collar workers; and (2) Sales are 
equal to the total value of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts. 
 
Sources: Anuatti-Neto et al. (2003); Fischer et al. (2002); and Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003b). 
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Real wage increase Industry-adjusted wage increase
 
 
The figure shows the median increase in real wages and industry-adjusted wages after privatization for each country. 
Real average wages are defined as the inflation-adjusted total compensation paid to the average worker. The 
Consumer Price Index was used as a deflator to calculate real wages. Industry-adjusted wages are computed by 
augmenting the pre-privatization value by the difference between the cumulative growth rate of real wages per worker 
of the firm and the cumulative growth rate of real wages per worker of the control group in the post-privatization 
period relative to the average real wage per worker before privatization. For Bolivia, Mexico and Peru information is 
for a sub-sample of firms that have available wage evidence. 
 
Source: Galiani et al. (2003); Garrón et al. (2003); Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c); and Torero (2002). 
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The figure shows the median gain in net-income-to-sales and operating-income-to-sales explained by savings in labor 
costs due to layoffs after privatization. Savings due to layoffs is calculated as: 
bpb p a p
ap




where Wagebp is the average wage of employees in the SOE before privatization; Lbp is the number of workers 
employed before privatization; Lap is the number of workers employed after privatization; and Salesap is the monetary 
value of sales after privatization. The resulting number is thus expressed as a fraction of sales. We then divide by the 
percentage point increase in the operating-income-to-sales ratio to determine the percentage of the increase that is due 
to transfers from workers. For Bolivia, Mexico and Peru information is for a sub-sample of firms that have available 
wage evidence. 
 
Source: Galiani et al. (2003); Garrón et al. (2003); Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c); and Torero (2002). 
  72FIGURE 14. 
CHANGES IN PROFITABILITY OF PRIVATIZED FIRMS IN COMPETITIVE AND  
































Competitive industries Noncompetitive industries
 
 
The figure presents the median change in profitability for competitive and non-competitive industries after 
privatization. Profitability is defined as the median ratio of operating-income-to-sales except for Peru where it is the 
mean net-income-to-sales ratio. Firms are sorted as competitive and non-competitive as follows: (1) for Mexico, firms 
are classified into competitive and non-competitive based on the description of the industry provided by the 
privatization prospectus of the firm; (2) for Chile, firms are classified as non-competitive if they are in 
telecommunications, electricity or social services sectors; and as competitive if they are not; (3) for Peru, the non-
competitive sectors are electricity, financial and telecommunications and the data for the competitive industries show 
aggregate information for the whole sample; (4) for Colombia, non-competitive firms are those in the energy sector, all 
other sectors are considered competitive. For Peru, the information is expressed in mean values. 
 




  73FIGURE 15. 
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT OF PRIVATIZED FIRMS IN COMPETITIVE AND 
NON-COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
 






























Competitive industries Noncompetitive industries  
 





























Competitive industries Noncompetitive industries  
 
The figure presents the median change in employment (Panel A) and output (Panel B) for 
competitive and non-competitive industries after privatization. The variables are defined as 
follows: (1) Employment corresponds to the total number of workers (paid and unpaid) who 
depend directly on the company; (2) Output is the monetary value of sales. Firms are sorted 
as competitive and non-competitive as follows: (1) for Mexico, firms are classified into 
competitive and non-competitive based on the description of the industry provided by the 
privatization prospectus of the firm; (2) for Chile, firms are classified as non-competitive if 
they are in telecommunications, electricity or social services sectors; and as competitive if 
they are not; (3) for Peru, the non-competitive sectors are electricity, financial and 
telecommunications and the information for competitive industries shows data for the whole 
sample; (4) for Colombia, non-competitive firms are those in the energy sector, all other 
sectors are considered competitive. For Peru, the information is expressed in mean values. 
For Chile, output information is not available. 
 
Source: Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c); Fischer et al. (2003); Pombo and Ramírez 
(2003); and Torero (2002). 
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The figure presents the percentage of privatized firms that re-hired workers after privatization in each geographic 
region. Variables are defined as follows: (1) Re-hiring is a dummy variable equal to one if the privatized firm re-hired 
previously fired workers up to 18 months after privatization, and zero otherwise; (2) Re-hiring same is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the privatized firm re-hires previously fired workers and places them in the same department 
from which they were fired up to 18 months after privatization, and zero otherwise. Previously fired workers are those 
that were terminated during the three years prior to privatization. 
 
Source: Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003c). 
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